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Abstract
In centralized school admissions systems, rationing at oversubscribed schools often uses
lotteries in addition to preferences. This partly random assignment is used by empirical
researchers to identify the effect of entering a school on outcomes like test scores. This
paper formally studies if the two most popular empirical research designs successfully
extract a random assignment. For a class of data-generating mechanisms containing
those used in practice, I show: One research design extracts a random assignment under a mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. In
contrast, the other research design does not necessarily extract a random assignment
under any mechanism.
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1

Introduction

The spread of choice and quasi-markets in public education is giving more families the option
to attend a school other than their neighborhood default. As choice has proliferated, school
assignment has grown increasingly centralized and algorithmic in order to respect heterogeneous preferences and various priorities based on family background. Centralized assignment
mechanisms solve the problem of matching the limited supply of school seats to the demand
for them by using centralized algorithms. Such mechanisms are employed in Boston, Charlotte, Denver, New Orleans, Newark, New York City, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and
numerous Asian and European countries. Well-designed centralized assignment provides a
transparent way to achieve a fair and efficient school seat allocation, while narrowing the
scope for strategic behavior (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Moreover, centralized assignment generates valuable data for empirical research on education. In particular, when a school is oversubscribed, mechanisms often use random lotteries
to ration limited seats. This generates quasi-experimental variation in school assignment
that opens the door to a variety of impact evaluations. Researchers used such variation to
study schools in the Bay Area (Bergman, 2016), Boston (Angrist et al., 2016), CharlotteMecklenburg (Hastings et al., 2009; Deming, 2011; Deming et al., 2014), Denver (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2016), and New York (Bloom and Unterman, 2014; Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2014b).1
Centralized assignment mechanisms combine lotteries, preferences, and priorities into
complex stratified randomized experiments. Empirical research designs based on such mechanisms therefore need to condition on appropriate objects to isolate random components
of their data-generating mechanisms. Yet, the above empirical work provides only a limited foundation for how their research designs extract a conditionally random assignment.2
Although the theoretical market design literature has analyzed the welfare and strategic
properties of mechanisms, it has so far little guidance to offer empirical researchers.
1

See also Hastings et al. (2012). Other studies use similar regression-discontinuity-style tie-breaking rules
to evaluate college majors in Norway (Kirkeboen et al., 2016) and in Chile (Hastings et al., 2013), daycare in
Italy (Fort et al., 2016), privately managed public schools in Trinidad and Tobago (Beuermann et al., 2016),
as well as popular selective schools in Ghana (Ajayi, 2013), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014), Romania (PopEleches and Urquiola, 2013), Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson, 2010, 2012), and the U.S. (Abdulkadiroğlu et
al., 2014a; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014). Narita (2015) uses lottery-based randomization to identify a structural
model of evolving demand for schools.
2
An exception is Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016). See the literature review at the end of this introduction for
the relationship between my paper and theirs. The other papers simply check empirical “covariate balance.”
That is, they compare the treatment and control groups by baseline characteristics or covariates that are
fixed at the time of treatment assignment and not used for it. If the two groups’ covariates are similar
(covariates are balanced), it is interpreted as not rejecting randomization. Covariate balance is necessary
but not sufficient for randomization.
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This paper studies when widely-used empirical research designs successfully extract conditionally random assignment of students to schools. I focus on the two most popular empirical
research designs that are applicable to any centralized mechanism that assigns students to
schools by combining: (1) applicants’ rank-ordered preferences over schools, (2) applicants’
priority statuses (e.g., walk zone) at schools, and (3) lottery numbers for breaking ties in
priority status. Each of the empirical examples above uses one of these research designs to
extract a random assignment.
The first research design, which I call the first-choice research design, focuses on applicants who rank a given treatment school first and are in the “marginal” priority group at
the school where some students are assigned to the treatment school while others are not.
Within this first-choice subsample, some applicants are assigned to the treatment school
while others are not, though all students rank it first and share the same priority; thus it
appears that treatment assignment is determined solely by lottery numbers. Based on this
idea, the first-choice research design assumes that applicants are randomly assigned to the
treatment school conditional on being in the first-choice subsample. It then compares the
outcomes (e.g., test scores) of students in the first-choice subsample who are assigned to the
treatment school against those who are not. The outcome difference between the two groups
is interpreted as a causal effect of the treatment school.
Despite its intuitive construction, the first-choice research design extracts a random assignment only under a condition.3 For a class of data-generating mechanisms containing
those used in practice, I show: The first-choice research design extracts a conditionally random assignment (i.e., applicants in the first-choice subsample share the same assignment
probability at the treatment school) for a mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism
is strategy-proof for schools.4 Here I treat strategy-proofness as an algorithmic property
that does not depend on any assumption about school behavior in reality. This result has
important implications for applied research. It justifies the first-choice research design for
mechanisms that are known to be strategy-proof for schools, such as the Boston (immediate
acceptance) mechanism (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006). It also suggests that attention should be
3

How can the first-choice design fail to extract a random assignment? To gain intuition, imagine the
treatment school A has only one seat, and the first-choice subsample contains two students, 1 and 2. Student
1 ranks only A while 2 ranks other schools below A. When 2 has a better lottery number than 1, 1 is rejected
by A and does not apply for any other school. When 1 has a better lottery number, 2 is rejected by A and then
applies for other schools, potentially crowding out other students there. These crowded-out students may
apply for A, which may crowd student 1 out of A. Such chain reactions of rejections and new applications
dilute 1’s, but not 2’s, treatment assignment probability at A. As a result, 1 and 2 may have different
treatment assignment probabilities, a potential problem with the first-choice design. Section 3.1 provides a
more precise example.
4
The if part is exactly true. The almost-only-if part means that the first-choice design sometimes fails to
extract a random assignment for any non-strategy-proof mechanisms used in the above empirical studies.
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paid to the research design for other widely-used mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for
schools, such as the deferred acceptance mechanism, a mechanism used in Charlotte, and
the top trading cycles mechanism.
By contrast to the above partial justification for the first-choice design, no similar sufficient condition is obtainable for another popular research design, which I call the qualification
instrumental variable (IV) research design. Unlike the first-choice research design (trying to
make assignments random by focusing on a subset of students), the qualification IV research
design considers all students. It then codes a supposedly random instrumental variable for
non-random assignments. The IV is based on “qualification,” i.e., whether a student’s lottery
number is better than the worst number offered a seat at the treatment school (conditional
on priority). I find that even in the simple case with no priorities and unit school capacities,
the qualification IV research design does not necessarily extract a random assignment for
any mechanism (within my mechanism class), i.e., applicants may not share the same conditional probability of qualification at the treatment school. This shows a contrast between
the qualification IV design and the first-choice design, as summarized in Table 1.5

Table 1: Summary of the main results
Do empirical research designs
always extract a random assignment?
Under mechanisms
strategy-proof for schools
(e.g., Boston mechanism)
Under other mechanisms
(e.g., deferred acceptance, Charlotte,
and top trading cycles mechanisms)

1st choice
Qualification IV
research design research design
X

×

×

×

Before I move on to the analysis, two remarks are in order about the initial result using
strategy-proofness for schools. First, I do not assume that schools have preferences or are
strategic in reality. This is because my analysis treats strategy-proofness not as a desideratum
or incentive compatibility constraint but rather as an algorithmic property, which turns out
to enable an empirical research design to extract a random assignment. Therefore, the
5

This comparison is based on the set of mechanisms under which each design always extracts a random
assignment. In fact, even if I fix a particular mechanism, the same point can be made in the following
sense: The above result for the qualification IV implies that for any mechanism, the qualification IV may
not extract a random assignment even in the simple case with no priorities and unit school capacities. By
contrast, in that simple case, the first-choice design sometimes extracts a random assignment under several
mechanisms, as shown below. Therefore, even conditional on a particular mechanism, the first-choice design
is weakly more likely to extract a random assignment.
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empirical implications of my theoretical result are free from any assumption about school
behavior or preference. In addition, I need no assumption on student behavior (e.g., truthful
preference reporting) because I study how to extract a random assignment conditional on
any reported preferences in data.
Second, the initial result — strategy-proofness for schools is sufficient for the first-choice
research design to extract a random assignment — has an additional empirical implication. Particularly, it provides an asymptotic support for the first-choice research design even
for mechanisms that are not strategy-proof in general. This is because such non-strategyproof mechanisms like deferred acceptance are known to be approximately strategy-proof
for schools in certain large markets with many students and schools (Roth and Peranson
(1999) and subsequent studies).6 This may explain why the first-choice design appears to
extract a random assignment in empirical applications even for non-strategy-proof mechanisms. Viewed differently, the existing empirical justification for the first-choice research
design in the form of covariate balance regressions may suggest the empirical relevance of
theoretical results on strategy-proofness in large markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, the next section
introduces my model. Section 3 defines the first-choice empirical research design and gives
conditions under which the research design extracts a random assignment. Section 4 analyzes the alternative qualification IV research design and compares it with the first-choice
research design. Section 5 confirms that my results are robust to a variety of modifications
to the definitions of research designs and randomization. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the
empirical implications of my theoretical results and suggests an agenda for further research.
Related Literature
This paper theoretically studies the empirical practice in the above-mentioned econometric
evaluations of school effectiveness. My analysis reveals the connection between their empirical strategies and theoretical market design studies, especially those on strategy-proofness.
In addition, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) is closely related. They develop a large-sample
framework based on an asymptotic approximation assuming a growing number of students
and school seats. They use their model to propose an improvement over the first-choice and
qualification IV research designs and apply the improved design to evaluate charter schools
in Denver. They also confirm that the first-choice and qualification IV research designs extract a random assignment for many mechanisms in the limit of their large market sequence.
In contrast, the current paper allows for general finite markets and provides conditions for
6

See, among others, Immorlica and Mahdian (2005); Kojima and Pathak (2009); Azevedo and Budish
(2013); Lee (2016); Ashlagi et al. (2016).
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the first-choice or qualification IV research design to extract a random assignment in a finite
sample. These conditions allow me to compare the two research designs, as in Table 1. I
also provide additional large market justifications for the first-choice research design in large
market models different from Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016)’s.

2

Framework

I use a model of school-student assignment with coarse school priorities and lotteries. There
are a finite set I of students and a finite set S of schools. Each student i ∈ I has a strict
preference i over S ∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes the outside option of the student. This i is i’s
reported preference recorded in the data; I do not make any assumption about whether i is
truthful or not. School s is said to be acceptable for student i if s i ∅. A preference profile
for all students is denoted by I ≡ (i )i∈I . Each school s has a capacity cs . Schools also
grant students various coarse priorities. ρis ∈ {1, ..., K} denotes student i’s priority at school
s where ρis < ρjs means s prioritizes i over j. Motivated by public school applications, I
assume every student is acceptable to every school. The number of possible priority statuses
K may change as the number of students |I| changes. Priorities may be coarse in the sense
that it is possible that ρis = ρjs for some i 6= j. Let ρs ≡ (ρis )i∈I . Denote the type of student
i by θi = (i , (ρis )s∈S ). I call X ≡ (I, S, I , (cs )s∈S , (ρs )s∈S ) an assignment problem.

2.1

Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms

A (stochastic) mechanism maps each assignment problem into a distribution over matchings
between students and schools. Mechanisms usually use lotteries to break indifferences or
ties in priority and then use the resulting strict priorities to create a matching. A random
variable Ris denotes student i’s lottery number at school s. Assume that at each school,
Ris is iid across students according to U [0, 1]. For the correlation of lottery numbers across
different schools, I consider two focal regimes. Under a “single tie breaker” (STB), each
student has a single lottery number used by all schools, i.e., Ris = Ris0 always holds for all
i, s, and s0 . Under a “multiple tie breaker” (MTB), each student has an independent lottery
number at each school, i.e., Ris and Ris0 are independent for all i and s 6= s0 .7 Let ris ∈ [0, 1]
denote i’s realized lottery number at school s and let R ≡ (Ris )i∈I,s∈S , and r ≡ (ris )i∈I,s∈S .
When referring to any r, I assume ris 6= rjs for all students i, j, and school s.
7

In reality, most school districts use STB, though some cities like Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and
Amsterdam use MTB. It is possible but requires messier notation to extend my analysis to any structure in
between STB and MTB where some schools use a common lottery while others use independent ones.

6

To define mechanisms of interest, I first introduce the following (student-proposing) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). The DA algorithm produces an assignment by using any given strict student preferences and strict school priority
orders as follows.
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its capacity, and rejects
every other student.
In general, for any subsequent step t ≥ 2,
• Step t: Each student i who was not tentatively matched to any school in Step t − 1
applies to her most preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its capacity from the set
of students tentatively matched to this school in previous step t − 1 and the students
newly applying, and rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step at which no student applies to any school. Each
student tentatively kept by a school at that step is allocated a seat in that school, resulting
in an assignment. I use this algorithm to define a class of mechanisms of interest as follows.8
Definition 1. A generalized deferred acceptance (gDA) mechanism ϕ is a mechanism
that can be expressed as the following procedure. Take any assignment problem as given.
(1) Draw lottery numbers r according to its lottery regime (STB or MTB).
(2) For each student i and school s, compute the modified priority
ρϕis ≡ f ϕ (ρis ) + g ϕ (rankis ),
where f ϕ : N → N (N is the set of positive integers) is a strictly increasing function,
rankis is the preference rank of school s in student i’s preference i , and g ϕ : N → N
is a weakly increasing function. Define school s’s ex post strict modified priority order
ϕrs over students by i ϕrs i0 if ρϕis + ris < ρϕi0 s + ri0 s .
(3) Given I and (ϕrs )s∈S , run the DA algorithm to produce an assignment, where each
school s’s priority order is given by ϕrs .
8
Others also use similar classes of mechanisms. See, for example, Ergin and Sönmez (2006); Pathak and
Sönmez (2008); Agarwal and Somaini (2015); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016).
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gDA mechanisms are parametrized by the lottery regime (STB or MTB) and the modified
priority function (f ϕ , g ϕ ). This gDA class includes most of the mechanisms used in empirical
research as I now show.
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the deferred acceptance (DA)
mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) makes a matching
through the DA algorithm in which schools’ strict priorities are induced by ρis + ris . The DA
mechanism makes no modification to priorities, and it corresponds to the gDA mechanism
with (f ϕ (m) = m, g ϕ (n) = 0).
Boston (Immediate Acceptance) Mechanism
Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the Boston (immediate acceptance) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) is
defined through the following immediate acceptance algorithm.
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school accepts its highest-priority (with respect to ρis + ris ) students up to its capacity
and rejects every other student.
In general, for any step t ≥ 2,
• Step t: Each student who has not been accepted by any school applies to her most
preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each school accepts its
highest-priority (with respect to ρis + ris ) students up to its remaining capacity and
rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step in which no student applies to any school. Each
student accepted by a school at some step of the algorithm is allocated a seat in that school.
The immediate acceptance algorithm differs from the DA algorithm in that when a school
accepts a student at a step, in the immediate acceptance algorithm, the student is guaranteed
that school, while in the deferred acceptance algorithm, that student may be later displaced
by another student with a better priority status.
The Boston mechanism can be interpreted as modifying priorities so that each school
prioritizes students ranking it higher over students ranking it lower, and it is known that
the Boston mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (f ϕ (m) = m, g ϕ (n) = (K + 1)n) (Ergin
and Sönmez, 2006). Under this (f ϕ (m), g ϕ (n)), any school’s modified priority order is lexicographic in preference ranks and priority statuses. That is, i ϕrs i0 for all i and i0 with
8

rankis < ranki0 s regardless of the original priorities ρis and ρi0 s and lottery numbers ris and
ri0 s ; i ϕrs i0 for all i and i0 with rankis = ranki0 s and ρis < ρi0 s regardless of lottery numbers
ris and ri0 s .
Charlotte Mechanism
The mechanism used in Charlotte is the same as the Boston mechanism except that each
school respects the walk zone priority ahead of preference ranks so that every student is
guaranteed a seat at her walk zone school (Hastings et al., 2009; Deming, 2011; Deming et
al., 2014). Assume without loss of generality that ρis = 1 means i has walk zone priority at s.
The Charlotte mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (f ϕ (m) = m + 1{m > 1}[K + (K +
1)|S|], g ϕ (n) = (K + 1)n). Under this (f ϕ (m), g ϕ (n)), any school’s modified priority order is
lexicographic in the walk zone priority status, preference ranks, and other (non-walk-zone)
priority statuses. That is, i ϕrs i0 for all i and i0 with ρis = 1 and ρi0 s > 1; i ϕrs i0 for all
i and i0 with 1{ρis = 1} = 1{ρi0 s = 1} and rankis < ranki0 s ; i ϕrs i0 for all i and i0 with
1{ρis = 1} = 1{ρi0 s = 1}, rankis = ranki0 s , and ρis < ρi0 s .

3

First-Choice Empirical Research Design

As explained in the introduction, many empirical studies use data from gDA mechanisms
to identify and estimate the causal effect of assignment to a treatment school on outcomes
such as test scores, crime rates, college attendance, and earnings.9 Their empirical research
designs fall into two categories. I start with analyzing one of them and move on to the other
in Section 4.
To describe the first empirical strategy, fix any gDA mechanism ϕ and assignment problem X that generates the data at hand. Following the standard notation in econometrics, let
Dis (r) = 1 if student i is assigned the treatment school s under (realized or counterfactual)
lottery number profile r; Dis (r) = 0 otherwise. I consider the set of students who rank s
first and are in s’s “marginal priority group,” where some students are assigned s but others
are not though all of them share the same priority at s. That is, define
F irsts (r)
9

Many of the studies mentioned in the introduction investigate the effect of a group of schools rather
than an individual school. My analysis extends to such group-level treatments too. Also, when the effect
of interest is that of attendance or enrollment rather than assignment, the analyst would see attendance
or enrollment as the endogenous treatment and use assignment as an instrument for the treatment. The
analyst would then use an instrumental variable method to estimate the effect of attendance or enrollment.
My analysis is applicable to such instrumental variable settings. See footnote 13.

9

≡ {i ∈ I|rankis = 1 and ∃i0 such that ranki0 s = 1, ρis = ρi0 s , and Dis (r) 6= Di0 s (r)}.10
Let r0 be the realized profile of lottery numbers in the data.
The first widely-used empirical strategy, which I call the first-choice research design,
compares the outcomes of students with Dis (r0 ) = 1 against those with Dis (r0 ) = 0 within
F irsts (r0 ).11 The outcome difference between the two groups is then interpreted as the
causal effect of being assigned to school s for students in F irsts (r0 ). The idea is that since
all students in F irsts (r0 ) rank s first and share the same priority at s, whether they get an
offer from s should be determined solely by their lottery numbers and hence independent
of students’ covariates or choices correlated with outcomes. Therefore, offers from s within
F irsts (r0 ) are thought of as being randomly assigned in a randomized controlled trial. Albeit
intuitive, for the first-choice research design to identify a causal effect by this logic, assignments to s within F irsts (r0 ) have to be indeed random and not confounded by non-random
preferences or priorities. This requirement is formalized as the following concept.
Definition 2. The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for a
gDA mechanism ϕ if at any assignment problem X, for any school s and all potential lottery
realizations r and all students j, k ∈ F irsts (r),
P (Djs (R) = 1) = P (Dks (R) = 1).
An equivalent requirement is
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r), θi = θ) = P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r)),
for any student type θ for which the left-hand-side conditional probability is well-defined.
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r), θi = θ) means the probability of assignment to s for an arbitrary
student of type θ in F irsts (r).
This property requires that conditional on being in F irsts (r0 ), offers from s are random and
independent of students’ preferences and priorities summarized by θi . In the econometric
10

Since rankis = ranki0 s = 1 holds and f ϕ (·) is strictly increasing by definition, ρis = ρi0 s is equivalent to

ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
(f ϕ (ρis ) + g ϕ (1) ≡)ρϕ
is = ρi0 s (≡ f (ρi0 s ) + g (1)).
ϕ
I could therefore replace ρis = ρi0 s with ρϕ
is = ρi0 s in the definition of F irsts (r) without changing anything
in the following analysis. Finally, note that it is possible F irsts (r) = ∅ for some or even all r.
11
Applications of the first-choice research design include Hastings et al. (2009); Deming (2011); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014b); Bloom and Unterman (2014); Deming et al. (2014); Angrist et al. (2016).
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terminology, this requires that the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) is constant across all students in F irsts (r0 ).12 Only under this conditionally random assignment
are the treatment and control groups in F irsts (r0 ) comparable with each other. Econometric program evaluation methods require this conditional independence for the first-choice
research design to identify a causal treatment effect (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapters
8 and 9, Manski (2008) chapters 3 and 7, Angrist and Pischke (2009) chapter 3.2).13

3.1

Motivating Example

Despite its intuitive construction, the first-choice research design may fail to extract a random
assignment. Consider the following example.
Example 1. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following preferences and priorities:
1 : A, B, ∅
2 : A, ∅
3 : B, A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : 1, {2, 3},
where 1 : A, B, ∅ means 1 prefers A over B and both schools are acceptable for 1; and
ρA : 3, {1, 2} means that A prioritizes 3 over 1 and 2 and is indifferent between 1 and 2. The
capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
In this example, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment
for A for the DA mechanism (with no priority modification). Under the DA mechanism, 1
is assigned to A when 1 has a better lottery number than 2 at A. Otherwise, 3 is assigned
to A. Each of the two cases occurs with equal probability 0.5. Thus,
P (D1A (R) = 1) = 1/2 6= 0 = P (D2A (R) = 1),
12
It is possible to define random assignment conditional on being in random F irsts (R), where R are
random lottery numbers and F irsts (R) is a random set. My result is robust to using such an alternative
definition; see Section 5.1.
13
When assignment within F irsts (r0 ) is used as an instrument for an endogenous treatment such as
enrollment, Definition 2 is interpreted as a conditional independence requirement for the instrument. For
the instrument to identify a causal effect, it usually needs to additionally satisfy properties such as “exclusion”
or “monotonicity.” See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007); Manski (2008); Angrist and Pischke (2009). In this
case, Definition 2 becomes a necessary condition. See also Sections 4 and 5.2 for related discussions.
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despite having

{1, 2} if r < r
1A
2A
F irstA (r) =
∅
otherwise.
Therefore, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for the DA
mechanism.14
The above problem may bias treatment effect estimates. Imagine that school A has
no real treatment effect, and student 1 ranks more schools than student 2 because student
1 is more eager and higher achieving (regardless of whether she attends A). Whenever
F irstA (r) = {1, 2}, student 1 gets the seat at A and student 2 does not. Comparing 1 and
2 within F irstA (r) = {1, 2}, the researcher is likely to mistakenly conclude A has a positive
achievement effect. This raises the question: For what mechanisms does the first-choice
research design extract a random assignment as desired?

3.2

Strategy-proofness for Schools

The success or failure of the first-choice research design turns out to be linked to a seemingly
unrelated property of mechanisms. So far, I have treated priorities and lottery numbers as
public information. In this section, I depart from this assumption and imagine a hypothetical
thought experiment in which schools have priorities and lottery numbers as their private
information, and the priorities and lottery numbers represent school preferences; I come
back to the interpretation of this thought experiment at the end of this section. Suppose
a gDA mechanism asks schools to report priorities and lottery numbers. Their reports are
not necessarily truthful. The gDA mechanism then uses the reported priorities and lottery
numbers to create a matching.
Given any assignment problem (I, S, I , (cs )s∈S ), let ϕ(ρ, r) ≡ (ϕs (ρ, r))s∈S be the assignment produced by a gDA mechanism ϕ when the reported priorities and lottery numbers
are (ρ, r). School s’s preference s , which is defined over the set of subsets of I, is said to
be responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , rs ) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992) if
(1) For any i, i0 ∈ I, if ρis + ris < ρi0 s + ri0 s , then for any I 0 ⊆ I r {i, i0 }, I 0 ∪ {i} s I 0 ∪ {i0 },
(2) ∅ s I 0 for any I 0 ⊆ I with |I 0 | > cs , and
14

It is possible to create a similar counterexample even when there are no priorities as long as ties are
broken by MTB. Also, Section 5.2 demonstrates the first-choice research design may fail even if I modify it
to the more refined version that pools applicants who rank the treatment school first and share the same
priority at every school. Conditioning on the whole preference list is not a solution, either.
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(3) For any I 0 ⊆ I with |I 0 | < cs and any i ∈ I \ I 0 , it holds I 0 ∪ {i} s I 0 .
I use these concepts to define the following property.
Definition 3. A gDA mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof for school s at assignment problem
X if given X, for any priority and lottery number profile (ρ∗ , r∗ ), any preference s responsive with respect to (cs , ρ∗s , rs∗ ), and any (ρ0s , rs0 ),
∗
ϕs (ρ∗ , r∗ ) s ϕs ((ρ0s , rs0 ), (ρ∗−s , r−s
)),

where s is the weak preference associated with s .15 A gDA mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof
for schools if it is strategy-proof for every school s at every X.
Though my setting is stochastic due to lotteries, this usual definition of strategy-proofness
is a non-stochastic, ex post concept. The standard behavioral interpretation of this concept
is that no school ever has a preference manipulation that is profitable with respect to its
true preference. It is crucial to note, however, that I am not concerned with this usual
interpretation. As will become clearer in the next section, in contrast to usual studies on
strategy-proofness, my analysis treats strategy-proofness not as a desideratum or an incentive
compatibility requirement. Instead I use strategy-proofness as a purely algorithmic property and am interested not in strategy-proofness itself but in its implications for empirical
research. As a result, I do not need to assume anything about school behavior. Therefore,
the following usual questions about strategy-proofness for schools are all irrelevant for my
analysis: Do schools have preferences? Are school preferences consistent with priorities? Do
schools ever “game” the system?

3.3

Sufficiency: Strategy-proofness Generates Natural Experiments

Strategy-proofness for schools turns out to be sufficient for the first-choice research design
to extract a random assignment.
Theorem 1. The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for a gDA mechanism ϕ if ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. Combined with existing results on strategy-proofness for
schools, Theorem 1 provides positive results for the first-choice research design for some of
the gDA mechanisms. (I describe another key implication in Section 3.5.)
The domain for (ρ∗s , rs∗ ) and (ρ0s , rs0 ) is a subset of {1, ..., K}|I| × [0, 1]|I| such that no two students share
the same value of ρis + ris at any school, where |I| is the number of students. This implies every student is
acceptable to every school in any (ρ∗s , rs∗ ) and (ρ0s , rs0 ). ρ∗ may or may not be the same as ρ in X. I do not
require either rs∗ or rs0 to be consistent with ϕ’s lottery structure.
15
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Corollary 1. a) The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for the
Boston mechanism with any lottery regime.
b) The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for the DA mechanism with
STB when there are no priorities (ρis = ρjs for all i, j, and s). This mechanism is often
called random serial dictatorship.
Proof. (a) follows from Theorem 1 and Ergin and Sönmez (2006)’s Theorem 2 that the
Boston mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. (b) follows from the proof of Theorem 1
and the fact that for the DA mechanism, truth-telling is optimal for any school s when all
the other schools report the same preference as s’s true preference. See Appendix A.2 for
details.
Before providing intuition, I illustrate Theorem 1 with the Boston mechanism. Consider
Example 1 in Section 3.1 and a thought experiment where schools have private preferences
and the mechanism asks schools to report their preferences. First of all, school A is never
matched with student 3 since 3 ranks A second and the seat at A is always filled by one
of the two students who rank A first. A is thus matched with either 1 or 2. When A’s
true preference is such that 1 A 2, A is matched with the more preferred student 1 by
truth-telling.16 When A’s true preference is with 2 A 1, A is matched with the more
preferred student 2 by truth-telling. Therefore, unlike with the DA mechanism discussed in
Section 3.1, there is no profitable preference manipulation for A; the Boston mechanism is
strategy-proof for A in Example 1 (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006).
As it should be by strategy-proofness and Theorem 1, the first-choice research design
extracts a random assignment for A in Example 1 for the Boston mechanism. Note that
F irstA (r) = {1, 2} for all r since only 1 and 2 rank A first with the same priority and
only one of them with a better lottery number is assigned A under any r. Enumerating all
lottery outcomes shows that 1 and 2 share the same assignment probability of 1/2 at A, i.e.,
P (D1A (R) = 1) = P (D2A (R) = 1) = 1/2. Therefore the first-choice research design extracts
a random assignment.
Intuition for the Proof
More generally, the intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows. Readers who are not interested
in the proof may skip the remainder of this section and jump to Section 3.4. A sufficient
condition for the first-choice research design to extract a random assignment for school s
is that as in randomized controlled trials, any permutation or shuffle of lottery numbers
16

Since A’s capacity is 1, I do not need to distinguish its preference over sets of students and its priority
order over individual students.
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ris within F irsts (r) translates into the corresponding permutation of assignments Dis (r).
Let me name this the “Fisher property” after Ronald Fisher, the inventor of randomized
experiments. Strategy-proofness for schools turns out to guarantee this Fisher property, as
the following two-step argument illustrates. For simplicity, ignore priority and consider the
case with unit school capacities and MTB (school-specific independent lotteries).
The first step of the intuition is summarized as “a preference manipulation is a lottery
number permutation.” It is a retrospectively obvious observation that with no priority and
MTB, each school’s strict priority is pinned down solely by lottery numbers at the school.
Any preference manipulation by school s in the hypothetical thought experiment (used for
defining strategy-proofness) corresponds to a permutation of lottery numbers at s in the real
world. This step does not use strategy-proofness for schools.
The second step is summarized as “an unprofitable preference manipulation is an assignment permutation.” This second step is more subtle and claims that when a preference
manipulation by school s is unprofitable for s, the associated permutation of lottery numbers ris results in the corresponding permutation of assignments Dis (r). To get an idea of
this, consider students i0 , i1 ∈ F irsts (r) such that s prefers/prioritizes i1 over i0 in the true
preference or the associated default lottery number rs . Assume that i1 is assigned to s while
i0 is not under rs . Also, suppose that there is no third student j whom s prefers over i0 but
dis-prefers over i1 , i.e., ri1 s < rjs < ri0 s .
Now suppose that in the thought experiment, school s manipulates its preferences by
swapping students i1 and i0 . That is, school s reports rs0 with ri00 s = ri1 s and ri01 s = ri0 s
but reports all other lottery numbers honestly. What does it mean that the data-generating
gDA mechanism is strategy-proof for schools and the manipulation is unprofitable for s? It
implies under the unit-capacity assumption that following this misreport, school s’s single
seat must be assigned to student i0 . To see this, consider how the DA algorithm operates
inside the gDA mechanism. In the first round, students i0 and i1 will apply to school s (as it
is their first choice by i0 , i1 ∈ F irsts (r0 )). School s’s single seat will be tentatively assigned
to i0 , who has a better (reported) lottery number than i1 by ri00 s = ri1 s < ri0 s = ri01 s . (Recall
the assumption made in the last paragraph that ri1 s < ri0 s , and student i1 is assigned to
school s absent school s’s manipulation.) In later rounds, school s would only reject i0 in
0
favor of some student j(6= i0 , i1 ) with (true) better lottery number (rjs =)rjs
< ri00 s (= ri1 s ).
But if school s were to get such a student j, then school s0 s preference manipulation would be
profitable, contrary to strategy-proofness for schools. Therefore, student i0 will be assigned
to school s, as claimed.17
17

Note that this reasoning depends on the assumption that i1 and i0 rank s first. In fact, Section 4 shows
that the intuition described here breaks down if I extend the first-choice research design to another design
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This is the desired Fisher property: School s’s preference manipulation of switching
students i0 and i1 , which corresponds to permuting i0 and i1 ’s lottery numbers at s (ri0 s
and ri1 s ), results in the corresponding permutation of i0 and i1 ’s assignments at s (Di0 s (r)
and Di1 s (r)). Therefore, if a gDA mechanism is strategy-proof for schools, any preference
manipulation is unprofitable and so the Fisher property holds, i.e., any lottery permutation
within F irsts (r) translates into the corresponding permutation of assignments. This enables
lottery permutations to induce a successful randomized experiment within F irsts (r), as
already explained above.
This intuition is still far from a complete proof, however. For instance, Theorem 1 allows
for additional complications like priorities, non-unit capacities, and STB, all of which the
above intuition ignores. When lotteries are correlated across schools as in STB, a lottery
permutation affects multiple schools simultaneously. This destroys the exact correspondence
between a lottery permutation in the real world and a unilateral preference manipulation by
a single school in the thought experiment, posing additional challenges. Nevertheless, the
proof in Appendix A.1 shows that the conclusion generally holds.

3.4

Almost Necessity

Theorem 1 shows that strategy-proofness for schools is sufficient for the first-choice research
design to extract a random assignment. Strategy-proofness turns out to be not only sufficient
but also nearly necessary in the following sense.
Proposition 1. Even with unit school capacities (cs = 1 for all s), the first-choice research
design does not extract a random assignment for the DA, Charlotte, and “top trading cycles” mechanisms (with any lottery regime), all which are known to be not strategy-proof for
schools.
To see this, consider the DA mechanism in Example 1. Imagine A’s true preference is
3 A 1 A 2 while B’s is 1 B 2 B 3. Under these true preferences, A is matched with
1. If A misreports 3 0A 2 0A 1, however, A is matched with 3, the most preferred student
with respect to A . Therefore, the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for A in Example 1.
This reconfirms the classic result that the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1992).
Intuitively, school A benefits from manipulating its preference and rejecting 1 by the
following chain reaction of rejections and applications. After being rejected by A, student 1
that contains students who do not rank s first. For the extended research design, strategy-proofness for
schools is shown to be no longer sufficient for a random assignment even with no priorities and unit school
capacities.
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next applies for B, which results in B’s rejecting 3. Student 3, the most preferred student for
A, then applies for and benefits A. The same chain reaction causes the first-choice research
design to fail. Depending on schools ranked below A, different applicants cause different
chain reactions that have different effects on assignment probabilities at A. As I showed in
Section 3.1, this can cause applicants in F irstA (r0 ) to have different assignment probabilities
at A.18
Similarly, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for the
Charlotte mechanism, another mechanism that is not strategy-proof for schools. Suppose
that 3’s priority at A and 1’s priority at B in Example 1 are walk zone priorities. In this case,
the Charlotte mechanism coincides with the DA mechanism in Example 1. The Charlotte
mechanism is therefore manipulable by schools and the first-choice research design fails in
the same way as for the DA mechanism. Section 5.3 also shows the same failure of the
first-choice design for yet another mechanism (the top trading cycles mechanism) that is not
strategy-proof for schools. In these senses, strategy-proofness for schools is almost necessary
for the first-choice research design to extract a random assignment.19
Empirical Illustration
Denver Public Schools use the usual DA mechanism for unified public and charter school
admissions. As shown above, the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools and may
not extract a random assignment via the first-choice research design. To see whether the
first-choice research design extracts a random assignment in Denver, I use the data from its
DA mechanism in school year 2011-2012 as follows.
(1) Taking student preferences, school priorities, and capacities as fixed, I simulate the
DA mechanism by drawing counterfactual lottery numbers one million times. This
gives me an approximate assignment probability P̂ (Dis (R) = 1) for each student i and
school s, i.e., the empirical frequency of student i’s being assigned to s over the one
million simulations.20
18

In contrast, for the Boston mechanism analyzed in the last section, such chain reactions do not affect
assignments to A. By its construction, for the Boston mechanism, each school is forced to prioritize students
ranking it higher over students ranking it lower. As a result, chain reactions caused by student i at schools
ranked below A involve only students who rank A lower than student i does. Since A rejects i, A also rejects
any students ranking A lower than i and thus A never accepts any student involved in chain reactions i
causes. Thus, different chain reactions caused by different students have the same effect on assignments at
A, that is, no effect at all. This is the reason why the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof for schools and
the first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for it.
19
On the other hand, strategy-proofness for schools turns out to be not exactly necessary. See Appendix
B.2 for details.
20
In Denver, each school is divided into multiple sub-schools (called “buckets”) with their own priorities

17

(2) For each school s and each student i in the realized first-choice subsample F irsts (r0 )
(if any), I demean i’s assignment probability by subtracting the mean of assignment
probabilities at s across all students in F irsts (r0 ). That is, I compute

P̂ demean (Dis (R) = 1) = P̂ (Dis (R) = 1) −

Σj∈F irsts (r0 ) P̂ (Djs (R) = 1)
.
|F irsts (r0 )|

(3) I plot this assignment probability deviation P̂ demean (Dis (R) = 1) across all schools s
and all students in F irsts (r0 ).
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Figure 1: The First Choice Design Fails for the DA Mechanism
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Notes: I simulate the DA mechanism with STB by drawing counterfactual lottery numbers one million times.
This gives us an approximate assignment probability. For each school s and each student i in F irsts (r0 ),
I demean i’s assignment probability by subtracting the mean of assignment probabilities at s across all
students in F irsts (r0 ). I plot the demeaned assignment probability across all students in ∪s∈S F irsts (r0 ).

The resulting histogram is in Figure 1. If the 1st choice strategy extracts a random
assignment, P̂ (Dis (R) = 1) ≈ P̂ (Djs (R) = 1) for all s and all i, j ∈ F irsts (r0 ) and so the
assignment probability deviation P̂ demean (Dis (R) = 1) would be almost 0 (up to simulation
errors) for all s and all i in F irsts (r0 ). As the figure shows, however, there are many values
of P̂ demean (Dis (R) = 1) that are far from 0. The mean is almost 0 (by construction) but
and capacities. Buckets correspond to schools in my theoretical model. Below I use “schools” to mean
buckets. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) for more details of the Denver school admissions system.
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the standard deviation is around 0.19. This provides an empirical illustration of the theoretical necessity of strategy-proofness for schools. I leave for future research whether these
assignment probability deviations result in any serious bias in treatment effect estimates.

3.5

Explaining Empirical Regularities

My analysis shows that the first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for
a gDA mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. This
justifies its use for strategy-proof mechanisms such as the Boston mechanism. However, care
should be taken when using it for non-strategy-proof mechanisms such as the DA, Charlotte,
and top trading cycles mechanisms.
There remains the puzzle, however, that even under the DA and Charlotte mechanisms,
the first-choice research design often receives empirical support for randomization. In particular, such applications usually find that in the first-choice subsample F irsts (r0 ), observable
covariates of students with Dis (r0 ) = 1 and Dis (r0 ) = 0 are similar, a standard check of
a necessary condition for randomization.21 How can I resolve the tension between their
empirical validity findings and my theoretical result?
A potential resolution is hinted by Theorem 1, the sufficiency of strategy-proofness for
schools. Unlike small counterexamples like Example 1, empirical work is only done with
data with at least hundreds of students. Though the DA and Charlotte mechanisms are not
strategy-proof for schools in general, they are often approximately so in certain large markets
with many students and schools, as has been shown empirically and theoretically (Roth and
Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Azevedo and
Budish, 2013; Lee, 2016; Ashlagi et al., 2016). The reason is that as the number of students
and schools grows, chain reactions of rejections and applications at schools ranked below
a manipulating school — which make the DA and Charlotte mechanisms manipulable in
Example 1 — become less likely to come back to the manipulating school and benefit it.
Existing empirical settings with hundred or thousands of students may therefore be subject
to large market forces that make the DA and Charlotte mechanisms almost non-manipulable
by schools. If so, Theorem 1 suggests the first-choice research design approximately extracts
a random assignment even for the DA and Charlotte mechanisms.
To see the effect of such large market forces, Figure 2 plots assignment probabilities at A
for two types of expansions of Example 1 and the DA mechanism (equivalent to the Charlotte
mechanism in this example).22 A computer program to implement this simulation is available
21

See, for example, Hastings et al. (2009)’s Table VI, Deming (2011)’s Table I, Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2014b)’s Table 2, Deming et al. (2014)’s Table A2.
22
Figure 2b is of more interest in that it is closer to the models of the above papers on strategy-proofness
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Figure 2: The Counterexample Evaporates in Large Markets
(a) Increasing Students and Number of Schools

(b) Increasing Students and School Size
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Notes: In Panel 2a, for each value of the x axis, I create an expansion of Example 1 with 2x schools
A1 , ..., Ax , B1 , ..., Bx with one seat each, and 3x students such that there are x students with each of the
following three preferences:
1 : A1 , B1 , A2 , B2 , ..., Ax , Bx , ∅
2 : A1 , ..., Ax , ∅
3 : B1 , A1 , B2 , A2 , ..., Bx , Ax , ∅
ρA1 , ..., ρAx : {students with 3 }, {students with 1 or 2 }
ρB1 , ..., ρBx : {students with 1 }, {students with 2 or 3 }.
In Panel 2b, for each value of the x axis, I create another expansion of Example 1 with x seats at each
of schools A and B, and 3x students such that there are x students of each of the three types. For each
scenario, I approximate the assignment probabilities by simulating the DA mechanism (equivalent to the
Charlotte mechanism in this example) with STB 100000 times.

upon request. This figure reveals that as the market size grows, the discrepancy between
student types 1 and 2’s assignment probabilities at A disappears, implying that breaks in
randomization under the first-choice research design become smaller and smaller. This may
explain why the first-choice research design often appears to extract a random assignment
in empirical applications even for mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for schools. At
the same time, the existing empirical support for the first-choice research design for the DA
and Charlotte mechanisms (recall footnote 21) can be re-interpreted as suggesting that large
market forces emphasized by the above theoretical market design papers are empirically
relevant. Theorem 1 thus provides a delicate asymptotic justification for the research design
even for some mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for schools in general.23
in large markets. For Figure 2a, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) complementarily show that in its limit, the
first-choice design extracts a random assignment under the DA mechanism.
23
This suggests that many empirical studies using the first-choice design for non-strategy-proof mechanisms
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4

Qualification Instrumental Variable Research Design

While the previous sections focus on the first-choice research design, several empirical studies
use an alternative research design, which I call the qualification instrumental variable (IV)
research design.24 Unlike the first-choice research design (which tries to make assignments
random by focusing on a subset of students), the qualification IV research design considers
all students and tries to code a random instrumental variable for non-random assignments.
Define the qualification IV by
Zis (r) ≡ 1{ρϕis + ris ≤ max{ρϕjs + rjs |Djs (r) = 1}}.
If there is no j with Djs (r) = 1, then define Zis (r) = 1 for all i. The qualification IV for a
student at a school is turned on if her realized priority rank at the school is better than that
of some student assigned to the school. Note that Zis (r) = 1 is possible even for students
who do not apply to school s.
The qualification IV looks random conditional on ρϕis and is likely to be correlated with
assignment Dis (r) since i never gets assigned when she is not qualified (Zis (r) = 0) but she
can get assigned when she is qualified (Zis (r) = 1). Based on this idea, the qualification IV
research design instruments for assignment Dis (r) by qualification Zis (r) conditional on ρϕis
and estimates treatment effects by Two Stage Least Square or other instrumental variable
models (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4, Manski (2008) chapter 3, Angrist and Pischke (2009) chapter 4).25 For this research design to identify a causal effect, the qualification
IV needs to be random conditional on ρϕis , as formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4. The qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment
for a gDA mechanism ϕ for school s at assignment problem X if given ϕ and X, for all
modified priority ρ and student type θ,
provide an unexpected set of empirical settings where treatment assignment is asymptotically random (but
not exactly random in a finite sample). For inference, therefore, it is appropriate to use recent econometric
program evaluation methods based on asymptotically random treatment assignment, such as Canay et al.
(2014) and Belloni et al. (2014).
24
For empirical examples of the qualification IV design, see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013); Dobbie and
Fryer (2014); Lucas and Mbiti (2014).
25
That is, for outcome Yi of interest and the realized lottery outcome r0 in the data, the qualification IV
research design uses the following Two Stage Least Square regression or a similar IV model:
ϕ
k
Yi = α2 + β2 Dis (r0 ) + ΣK
k=1 γ2 1{ρis = k} + 2i (second stage regression)
ϕ
k
Dis (r0 ) = α1 + β1 Zis (r0 ) + ΣK
k=1 γ1 1{ρis = k} + 1i (first stage regression)
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P (Zis (R) = 1|ρϕis = ρ, θi = θ) = P (Zis (R) = 1|ρϕis = ρ).
An equivalent requirement is
P (Zjs (R) = 1) = P (Zks (R) = 1)
for all students j, k ∈ I with ρϕjs = ρϕks . The qualification IV research design extracts a
random assignment for a gDA mechanism ϕ if it does so for every school s at every problem
X.
This property requires that conditional on modified priority status ρϕis , being qualified for
s is random and independent of students’ preferences and priorities summarized by θi . Only
under this conditionally random assignment does the qualification IV Zis generate exogenous
or random variation in assignment Dis .26 It turns out that no gDA mechanism satisfies the
above property even in the simple case with no priorities and unit capacities.
Proposition 2. Consider any sets of at least three students and at least three schools. Even
with no priorities (ρis = ρjs for all students i, j, and school s) and unit school capacities
(cs = 1 for all s), there exist student preference profiles at which every student ranks some
schools and the following holds: There is no gDA mechanism with any lottery regime for
which the qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment.
The proof is in Appendix A.3. I illustrate this result by an example.
Example 2. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and schools A, B, C with the following
preferences and priorities:
1 : B, A, ∅
2 : B, ∅
3 : C, A, ∅
4 , 5 : C, ∅
ρA , ρB , ρC : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
26

Definition 4 for the qualification IV design may appear to be incomparable with Definition 2 for the
first-choice design. However, Appendix B.1 shows that these two definitions are special cases of a unified
definition of a random assignment under general empirical research designs, including the first-choice and
qualification IV designs. Hence, it is legitimate to use Definitions 2 and 4 to compare the two research
designs.

22

Students 1 and 3 share the same modified priority ρϕiA for any gDA mechanism ϕ:
Both students 1 and 3 rank A second and have the same priority at A so that ρϕ1A ≡
f ϕ (ρ1A ) + g ϕ (rank1A ) = f ϕ (ρ3A ) + g ϕ (rank3A ) ≡ ρϕ3A , which I denote by ρ. Nevertheless,
enumerating all possible lottery orders shows that for any gDA mechanism, we have
P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 ) = 2/3 6= 5/6 = P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ3 ) for STB
P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 ) = 2/3 6= 3/4 = P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ3 ) for MTB.
A computer program to implement this computation is available upon request. Therefore,
even with no priorities and unit capacities, the qualification IV research design does not
extract a random assignment for any gDA mechanism.27
Intuitively, the qualification IV research design fails in this example because students 1
and 3 experience different levels of competition at their first-choice schools B and C, respectively, before applying for A. Let me consider the following cases.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor 3 applies for A, i.e., 1 and 3 are assigned B and C, respectively.
In this case, no student applies for A, and A is undersubscribed. Both 1 and 3 are therefore
qualified for A.
Case ii : Only student 1 applies for A. In this case, 1 is always assigned A and qualified
for A. By ρϕ1A = ρϕ3A shown above, student 3 is qualified for A if and only if 3 has a better
lottery number than 1 at A.
Case iii : Only student 3 applies for A. In this case, 3 is always assigned A and qualified for
A. Student 1 is qualified for A if and only if 1 has a better lottery number than 3 at A.
Case iv : Both students 1 and 3 apply for A. In this case, only one of 1 and 3 with a better
lottery number is assigned A and qualified for A.
For simplicity, consider the MTB lottery regime. Cases i and iv are ignorable since they
do not cause any difference between 1’s and 3’s qualification probabilities at A. Conditional
ϕ
Since both ρϕ
1A = ρ3A and ρ1A = ρ3A , the counterexample works even if I use original priorities to
0
define an alternative qualification IV as Zis
(r) ≡ 1{ρis + ris ≤ max{ρjs + rjs |Djs (r) = 1}}. Also, note that
students 1 and 3 share the same priority at all schools in the above example. Thus, the qualification IV
research design may fail even if I modify it to the more refined version that conditions on having the same
priority at all schools. Finally, the qualification IV research design does not extract a random assignment
even for the top trading cycles mechanism, as shown in Section 5.3.
27
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on Case ii, student 1 is qualified for sure while 3 is qualified with probability 0.5, the
probability that 3 has a better lottery number than 1 for A. Likewise, conditional on Case
iii, student 3 is qualified for sure, but 1 is qualified only with probability 0.5. Crucially,
Case iii is more likely to happen than Case ii since 3’s first choice (C) is more competitive
than 1’s (B) and so 3 is more easily rejected by the first choice and more likely to apply for
A. As a result, 3 is more likely to be qualified for A than 1 due to differential competition
at their first-choice schools, as the proof in Appendix A.3 makes it precise. The proof also
generalizes this observation to any lottery regime and any market size. Section 5.2 shows
that the problem with the qualification IV persists even if I modify its definition, e.g., by
changing the priority cutoff max{ρϕjs + rjs |Djs (r) = 1} to a constant number.
The above discussion illustrates a general point that students may have different qualification probabilities depending on which schools they rank higher than the treatment school.
This does not matter for students in the first-choice subsample F irsts (r0 ) since everybody
in F irsts (r0 ) ranks the same schools above the treatment school, that is, no school at all.
Therefore, the above trouble does not happen to the first-choice research design focusing on
the first-choice subsample F irsts (r0 ). In this sense, there are more threats to the qualification IV design than to the first-choice design.
Proposition 2 therefore sheds light on a contrast between the qualification IV and the
first-choice research designs. Unlike the first-choice research design, strategy-proofness for
schools is no longer sufficient for the qualification IV research design to extract a random
assignment, and it may extract an unintended broken random assignment not only for the
DA or top trading cycles mechanism but also for the Boston mechanism and random serial
dictatorship discussed in Corollary 1.

5

Discussion

5.1

Alternative Definition of a Random Assignment

Definition 2 of a “random assignment” requires that all students in realized fixed set F irsts (r0 )
share the same assignment probability (propensity score). A possible alternative definition
treats F irsts (R) as random and requires that
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (R), θi = θ) = P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (R))
for all i for whom these probabilities are defined. Recall that R denotes the random (not realized) lottery number profile. This alternative definition requires that Dis (R) is independent
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of type θi or the propensity score as a confounder conditional on random event i ∈ F irsts (R).
This independence conditional on a random event or statistic is reminiscent of Chamberlain
(1980) and Rosenbaum (1984)’s conditional logit panel frameworks, where the treatment
distribution is independent of individual heterogeneity conditional on the random empirical
frequency of being treated in the past.
All of my arguments extend to this alternative definition. See Appendix A.1 (especially
Remark 1) for why Theorem 1 is correct even under the alternative definition. The discussion about the Boston mechanism under Example 1 in Section 3.3 goes through even under
the alternative definition since P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ) = 1/2 for i = 1, 2 and
is independent of θ. The analysis of the DA and Charlotte mechanisms in Example 1 in
Sections 3.1 and 3.4 also remains essentially the same since
P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ1 ) = 1 6= 0 = P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ2 ),
where θ1 and θ2 denote student types having 1 and 2 , respectively. This shows that the
first-choice design does not extract a random assignment.

5.2

Alternative Definitions of Research Designs

Section 4 shows a potential problem with the qualification IV Zis (r) ≡ 1{ρϕis + ris ≤
max{ρϕjs + rjs |Djs (r) = 1}}, where max{ρϕjs + rjs |Djs (r) = 1} is a random priority cutoff
that varies as the lottery outcome changes. One may expect a modification of the qualification IV to solve the problem. For any constant π ∈ [0, K + 1], define the constant cutoff
qualification IV by
Zisπ (r) ≡ 1{ρϕis + ris ≤ π}.
In practice, the econometrician would define π ≡ max{ρϕjs + r0js |Djs (r0 ) = 1} where r0 is the
realized lottery numbers in the data. The constant cutoff qualification IV trivially extracts
a random assignment since P (Zisπ (R) = 1|ρϕis = ρ, θi = θ) = P (ris ≤ π − ρϕis |ρϕis = ρ, θi =
θ) = π − ρ, which is constant and independent of θ conditional on ρϕis = ρ.
However, the constant cutoff qualification IV entails new problems other than randomness. First, when using π ≡ max{ρϕjs + r0js |Djs (r0 ) = 1}, I define or select an instrument
depending on the realized data. Such data-dependent model selection often makes standard
inference invalid (Leamer, 1978). In addition, perhaps more importantly, the constant cutoff
qualification IV may violate other requirements for a valid IV than random assignment or
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independence even with no priority. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 3. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, 4 and schools A and B with the following preferences and priorities:
1 , 2 : A, B, ∅
3 , 4 : B, ∅
ρA , ρB : {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A. Without loss of generality, set
ρϕ1A = ρϕ2A = 0.
Consider two lottery outcomes at school A:
• rA ≡ (r1A , r2A , r3A , r4A ) with r1A < r2A < r3A , r4A and r2A ≤ 0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
• rA
≡ (r1A
, r2A
, r3A
, r4A
) with r3A
, r4A
< r2A
< r1A
and r2A
> 0.5.
0.5
0.5
Fix any lottery numbers rB at school B. Clearly, Z1A
(rA , rB ) = Z2A
(rA , rB ) = 1 and
0.5 0
0.5 0
Z1A (rA , rB ) = Z2A (rA , rB ) = 0. On the other hand, for any gDA mechanism, D1A (rA , rB ) =
0
0
1, D1A (rA
, rB ) = 0, D2A (rA , rB ) = 0, and D2A (rA
, rB ) = 1. This violates the “monotonic0.5
ity” requirement for ZiA as an instrument for DiA : Endogenous variables D1A and D2A
0.5
move in the opposite directions in response to the same change in the IV from ZiA
= 1 to
0.5
ZiA = 0. Monotonicity is required by many modern IV models with heterogeneous behavior
and treatment effects (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4, Manski (2008) chapter 3,
Angrist and Pischke (2009) section 4.4). Therefore, while the constant cutoff qualification
IV always extracts a random assignment, it may not be able to identify a causal effect due
to monotonicity violations.
Furthermore, since F irstA (r) = {1, 2} for all r, this monotonicity violation persists even
if I restrict the sample to F irstA (r0 ). Also, since both ρϕ1A = ρϕ2A and ρ1A = ρ2A , the
counterexample works even if I use original priorities to define an alternative constant cutoff
qualification IV as Zis0.5 (r) ≡ 1{ρiA + ris ≤ 0.5}. Finally, note that 1 and 2 share the same
priority at all schools. Thus the constant cutoff qualification IV research design may fail to
satisfy monotonicity even if I modify it to the more refined version that conditions on having
the same priority at all schools.
Example 3 also shows that yet another potential modification of the qualification IV does
not extract a random assignment either. For any positive integer m, define the constant
rank qualification IV by
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Zism-th (r) ≡ 1{ris ≤ m-th({rjs |j ∈ I})},
where m-th(·) is the m-th order statistic.28 The constant rank qualification IV extracts a
random assignment since P (Zism-th (R) = 1|ρϕis = ρ, θi = θ) = m/|I| is independent of θ.
However,
2nd
2nd
0.5
0.5
• Z1A
(rA , rB ) = Z2A
(rA , rB ) = 1(= Z1A
(rA , rB ) = Z2A
(rA , rB )) and
2nd 0
2nd 0
0.5 0
0.5 0
• Z1A
(rA , rB ) = Z2A
(rA , rB ) = 0(= Z1A
(rA , rB ) = Z2A
(rA , rB )).
0.5
2nd
Therefore, by the same reason for ZiA
, potential IV ZiA
violates monotonicity regardless
29
of whether I restrict the sample to F irstA (r0 ).
The above discussion also shows that
the simplest possible IV, the random number ri itself, suffers from the same monotonicity
violation.
Finally, going back to the original first-choice and qualification IV research designs, they
might fail to extract a random assignment even if I modify them to the more refined version that conditions on sharing the same priority at every school. Consider the following
modification of Example 1.

Example 4. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following preferences and priorities:
1 : A, B, ∅
2 : A, ∅
3 : B, A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : {1, 2, 3},
where ρ3A is walk zone priority. The indifferences in the school priorities are broken by STB.
The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
The only difference from Example 1 is ρB : School B is now indifferent among all students.
In Example 4, students 1 and 2 rank A first and share the same priority at both A and B.
However, students 1 and 2 do not share the same assignment probability at A for the DA or
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
m-th
Other possible definitions are Zis
(r) ≡ 1{ρϕ
is +ris ≤ m-th({ρjs +rjs |j ∈ I, ρjs = ρis })} or 1{ρis +ris ≤
m-th({ρjs + rjs |j ∈ I, ρjs = ρis })}. The discussion below applies to these alternative definitions too.
29
All of the above points in this Section 5.2 apply to the top trading cycles mechanism, as shown in the
next Section 5.3.
28
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Charlotte mechanism: Under the DA mechanism,

F irstA (r) =


∅

if r2 < r1 < r3

{1, 2} otherwise,

where ri is student i’s lottery number used by both schools. Nevertheless, enumerating all
lottery outcomes shows that
P (DiA (R) = 1|θi = θ1 ) = P (ZiA (R) = 1|θi = θ1 ) = 1/2
6= 1/3 = P (DiA (R) = 1|θi = θ2 ) = P (ZiA (R) = 1|θi = θ2 ).
Thus neither the first-choice or qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment
for the DA mechanism even if they condition on sharing the same priority at every school.
For the first-choice research design, this point remains true even if using the alternative
random assignment criterion in Section 5.1 since P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ1 ) =
3/5 6= 2/5 = P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ2 ).
Likewise, conditioning on the whole preference list is not a solution. Consider yet another
modification of Example 1.
Example 5. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following preferences and priorities:
1 : A, B, ∅
2 : A, B, ∅
3 : B, A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : 1, 3, 2,
where ρ3A and ρ1B are walk zone priority. The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment
school is A.
The key difference from Example 1 is 2 : Students 1 and 2 share the same preference
list, i.e., 1 =2 . Nevertheless, the first-choice or qualification IV research design does not
extract a random assignment for the DA or Charlotte mechanism: 1 is assigned to A when
1 has a better lottery number than 2 at A. Otherwise, 3 is assigned to A. Each of the two
cases occurs with equal probability 1/2. Thus,
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P (D1A (R) = 1) = P (Z1A (R) = 1) = 1/2 6= 0 = P (Z2A (R) = 1) = P (D2A (R) = 1),
despite having

{1, 2} if r < r
1A
2A
F irstA (r) =
∅
otherwise.
Therefore, the first-choice or qualification IV research design does not necessarily extract a
random assignment for the DA or Charlotte mechanism even if one additionally conditions
on the entire preference list.

5.3

Top Trading Cycles Mechanism

Some cities such as New Orleans and San Francisco have used a mechanism outside the generalized DA class studied in this paper. This mechanism, the top trading cycles mechanism,
is also advocated by matching market design researchers as a Pareto efficient mechanism
that is strategy-proof for students (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Definition 5. The top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism creates a matching through
the following procedure. Take any assignment problem as given.
(1) Draw r according to its lottery regime (STB or MTB).
(2) Define s’s ex post strict priority order rs over students by i rs i0 if ρis +ris < ρi0 s +ri0 s .
(3) Given I and (rs )s∈S , run the following top trading cycles algorithm (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974).
• Step t ≥ 1: Each student i points to her most preferred acceptable remaining
school (if any). Students who do not point to any school are assigned to ∅. Each
school s points to its most preferred student. As there are a finite number of
schools and students, there exists at least one cycle, i.e., a sequence of distinct
schools and students (i1 , s1 , i2 , s2 , . . . , iL , sL ) such that student i1 points to school
s1 , school s1 points to student i2 , student i2 points to school s2 , . . . , student iL
points to school sL , and, finally, school sL points to student i1 . Every student
il (l = 1, . . . , L) in any cycle is assigned to the school she is pointing to. Any
student who has been assigned a school seat or the outside option as well as any
school s which has been assigned students such that the number of them is equal
to its capacity cs is removed. If no student remains, the algorithm terminates.
Otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
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This algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps because at least one student
is matched with a school (or ∅) at each step and there are only a finite number of
students.
It is possible to apply the first-choice research design to data from the TTC mechanism.
However, the TTC implementation of the first-choice research design turns out not to extract
a random assignment, as stated in Proposition 1.30 In Example 1, the TTC mechanism
always assigns 1 to A under all lottery realizations r (regardless of whether the lottery
structure is STB or MTB); no randomization occurs. Therefore, F irstA (r) = {1, 2} for all
r, but P (Dis (R) = 1|θi = θ1 ) = 1 6= 0 = P (Dis (R) = 1|θi = θ2 ). Thus the first-choice
research design does not extract a random assignment for the TTC mechanism.31 The same
logic also implies that the qualification IV research design fails in this example. In fact,
the qualification IV research design for the TTC mechanism does not extract a random
assignment even without priorities. It can be seen from Example 2, since there are no
priorities and the top trading cycles mechanism is equivalent to the DA mechanism.
This failure of the first-choice research design is related to the fact that the TTC mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools. In Example 1, imagine A’s true preference is
3 A 2 A 1 while B’s is 1 B 2 B 3. Under these true preferences, A is matched
with 1. If A misreports 2 0A 1, 3, however, A is matched with 2, who is preferred to 1
under A . Therefore, the TTC mechanism is not strategy-proof for A in Example 1. This
is a reconfirmation of the well-known fact that the TTC mechanism is not strategy-proof for
schools, and provides further support for the necessity of strategy-proofness for schools for
successful randomization under the first-choice research design.

6

Conclusion

The above analysis provides a formal basis for understanding when and why the two popular
empirical research designs do or do not extract a random assignment. The first-choice design
does so for mechanisms that are strategy-proof for schools; the design may break down
for other mechanisms, but the problem approximately goes away in certain large markets
where these mechanisms become approximately strategy-proof. On the other hand, the
qualification IV design does not necessarily extract a random assignment for any mechanism,
30

It is possible to show that the more refined version of the first-choice design which conditions on having
the same priority at every school extracts a random assignment for the TTC mechanism. This makes a
contrast with the DA and Charlotte mechanisms, for which even the more refined first-choice design does
not extract a random assignment (recall Section 5.2).
31
This point remains the same under the alternative definition of extracting a random assignment in
Section 5.1: P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ1 ) = 1 6= 0 = P (DiA (R) = 1|i ∈ F irstA (R), θi = θ2 ).
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thus suggesting a difference between the two research designs. Table 1 in the introduction
provides a summary of the main results.
This paper takes a step toward deciphering theoretical structures hidden in empirical
research designs exploiting market design with lotteries. This opens the door to several open
questions. For example, while my framework assumes the use of random lottery numbers
for tie-breaking, some existing empirical studies use data with regression-discontinuity-style
tie-breaking by admissions test scores. I would expect the point of the current paper to be
valid even in regression discontinuity situations, but it is open how to extend this paper’s
results to a regression discontinuity setting. Also, my results point to the importance of
strategy-proofness for schools within the mechanism class I focus on. It is thus important to
characterize or axiomatize mechanisms that are strategy-proof for schools in the class. It is
also a technical open question to use Theorem 1 and existing results on strategy-proofness
in the large to formally justify the first-choice research design in large markets.
An even more ambitious agenda is to design assignment mechanisms that enable as
informative causal inference as possible (subject to welfare and strategic considerations). For
example, it is intriguing to compare the Boston, DA, and top trading cycles mechanisms with
different lottery regimes by their capabilities for quasi-experimental information production.
The contrast between Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 is a step toward such a comparison.
Finally, the empirically most important direction is to see if possible randomization failures
(recall Propositions 1 and 2) cause significant biases in treatment effect estimates in real
data. I leave these challenging directions for future research.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
A
A.1

Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1

Preliminaries
I use the following lemma to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. a) The following holds for any assignment problem and any gDA mechanism ϕ
that is strategy-proof for schools. For each lottery number profile r, let δs (r) be any permutation of rs that switches only i0 and i00 such that ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s and min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } >
ρϕis + ris for all i with Dis (r) = 1. If there are no such i0 and i00 , let δs (r) = rs . Then
ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs (r), r−s ), where ϕ(r) is a shorthand for ϕ(ρ, r), the assignment produced by a
gDA mechanism ϕ when the reported priorities and lottery numbers are (ρ, r).
b) The following holds for any assignment problem and any gDA mechanism ϕ. For each
lottery number profile r, let δs (r) be any permutation of rs that switches only two students i0
and i00 such that ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s and there exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s +
ri00 s } ≤ ρϕis + ris . If there are no such i0 and i00 , let δs (r) = rs . Then ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs (r), r−s ).
Proof of Lemma 1. a) For any assignment problem, a deterministic assignment (or a
matching) is a vector µ that assigns each school s a set of at most cs students µs ⊂ I, and
assigns each student i a seat at a school or the outside option µi ∈ S ∪ {∅}. A matching µ
is individually rational if µi i ∅ for every i ∈ I. With the notation ρϕ ≡ (ρϕis )i∈I,s∈S , µ
is (ρϕ , r)-blocked by (s, i) ∈ S × I if s i µi and either |µs | < cs or there exists ī ∈ I such
that i ϕrs ī, i.e., ρϕis + ris < ρϕīs + rīs . A matching µ is (ρϕ , r)-stable if it is individually
rational and not (ρϕ , r)-blocked by (s, i).
Fact 1. (Roth and Sotomayor (1992)’s Theorem 5.8) For any assignment problem X, any
lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism ϕ, any (ρϕ , r)-stable matching µ, any school s,
any preference ϕs responsive with respect to (cs , ρϕ , r), it holds µs ϕs ϕs (ρ, r), where ϕs (ρ, r)
is the set of students assigned to s in the outcome of ϕ under X and r.
Fact 2. (Roth and Sotomayor (1989)’s Theorem 4) For any assignment problem X, any
lottery number profile r, and any gDA mechanism ϕ, let µ and µ0 be (ρϕ , r)-stable matchings
with µs ϕs µ0s for some preference ϕs responsive with respect to (cs , ρϕs , rs ). Then, for any
i ∈ µs and i0 ∈ µ0s \ µs , it holds i ϕrs i0 , i.e., ρϕis + ris < ρϕi0 s + ri0 s .
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Fact 3. Under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism
ϕ, any δs (r) satisfying the conditions in the statement of Lemma 1.a, every (ρϕ , r)-stable
matching is also (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable.
Proof of Fact 3 . Let µ be a (ρϕ , r)-stable matching. i0 , i00 6∈ µs by Facts 1 and 2 and
the assumption that i0 , i00 6∈ ϕs (ρ, r). The only potential (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-blocking pairs
against µ are (s, i0 ) and (s, i00 ) since the only difference between r and (δs (r), r−s ) is the
positions of i0 and i00 in rs . Since (1) both µ and ϕ(ρ, r) are (ρϕ , r)-stable and (2) min{ρϕi0 s +
ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } > ρϕis + ris for all i with Dis (r) = 1, Facts 1 and 2 imply that for any i ∈ µs ,
ρϕis + ris < min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } = min{ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r), ρϕi00 s + δi00 s (r)}, where the last
equality comes from ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s . Neither (s, i0 ) nor (s, i00 ) thus (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-blocks µ.
Fact 4. Under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism
ϕ that is strategy-proof for schools, any δs (r) satisfying the conditions in the statement of
Lemma 1.a, every (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable matching is also (ρϕ , r)-stable.
Proof of Fact 4 . Suppose to the contrary that µ is (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable but not (ρϕ , r)stable. I show that it contradicts the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
Step 1.1. Either student i0 or i00 (but not both) is in µs .
Proof of Step 1.1. Case i : Suppose that neither i0 nor i00 (but not both) is in µs . By
the (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stability of µ, neither (s, i0 ) or (s, i00 ) does (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-block µ.
Either (s, i0 ) or (s, i00 ) does (ρϕ , r)-blocks µ, since (1) µ is (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable and so
individually rational and (2) the only difference between r and (δs (r), r−s ) is the positions
of i0 and i00 in rs . That is, there exists i ∈ µs such that min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } <
ρϕis + ris < min{ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r), ρϕi00 s + δi00 s (r)} = min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s }, a contradiction.
Case ii : Suppose that both i0 and i00 are in µs . Since µ is not (ρϕ , r)-stable but is
individually rational (by its (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stability), there exists i such that s i µi
and ρϕis + ris < max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } = max{ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r), ρϕi00 s + δi00 s (r)}, a
contradiction to the (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stability of µ.
Step 1.2. ϕs (r) 6= ϕs (δs (r), r−s ).
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Proof of Step 1.2. i0 , i00 6∈ ϕs (r) (by assumption), either i0 or i00 is in µs (by Step
1.1), and Fact 3 implies that (ρϕ , r)-stable ϕs (r) is (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable. Thus,
ϕ
Facts 1 and 2 implies that for any ϕδ
s responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , (δs (r), r−s )),
it holds that ϕs (r) ϕδ
µs , where I use the fact that µ is not (ρϕ , r)-stable and so
s
ϕ
µ 6= ϕ(r). Fact 1 implies that for any ϕδ
s responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , (δs (r), r−s )),
it holds that µs ϕδ
ϕs (δs (r), r−s ). The two preference relations ϕs (r) ϕδ
µs and
s
s
µs ϕδ
ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) jointly imply that for any ϕδ
responsive with respect to
s
s
ϕ
ϕδ
(cs , ρs , (δs (r), r−s )), ϕs (r) s ϕs (δs (r), r−s ), implying ϕs (r) 6= ϕs (δs (r), r−s ).
Step 1.3. ϕs (r) ϕs ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) for some preference δs responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , δs (r)),
a contradiction to the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
Proof of Step 1.3. Take any s responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , rs ). If ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) s
ϕs (r), then it is a contradiction to the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
This implies ϕs (r) s ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) since ϕs (r) 6= ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) as shown in Step 1.2.
Note that s is also responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , δs (r)) since (1) the only difference
between r and (δs (r), r−s ) is the positions of i0 and i00 in rs , and (2) i0 , i00 6∈ ϕs (r) by
assumption. Therefore, ϕs (r) ϕs ϕs (δs (r), r−s ) for some δs responsive with respect to
(cs , ρs , δs (r)).
Facts 3 and 4 imply that under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile
r, any gDA mechanism ϕ that is strategy-proof for schools, any δs (r) satisfying the conditions in the statement of Lemma 1.a, the set of (ρϕ , r)-stable matchings coincides with
the set of (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable matchings. Each student or school except s has the
same set of responsive preferences over these common stable matchings both under r and
(δs (r), r−s ). School s also has the same preference over these stable matchings both under r
and (δs (r), r−s ) since (1) the only difference between r and (δs (r), r−s ) is the positions of i0
and i00 in rs , and (2) min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } > ρϕis + ris for all i with Dis (r) = 1 and thus
Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 0, which in turn implies i0 , i00 6∈ µs for any (ρϕ , r)- or (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))stable matching µ. Therefore, the school pessimal (ρϕ , r)-stable matching is the same as the
school pessimal (ρϕ , (δs (r), r−s ))-stable matching, i.e., ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs (r), r−s ).
b) Under r or (δs (r), r−s ), let t0 be the step in the DA algorithm at which either i0 or i00 or
both first apply for s. If there is no such a step t0 under either r or (δs (r), r−s ), then the DA
algorithm works in the same way until its end both under r and (δs (r), r−s ), completing the
proof. Assume the existence of such a step t0 under both r and (δs (r), r−s ). Until step t0 − 1,
the DA algorithm operates in the same way both under r and (δs (r), r−s ) since the only
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difference between the two situations is the positions of i0 and i00 in rs . t0 is thus common
to r and (δs (r), r−s ). Let Ist0 be the set of students who are kept by s from step t0 − 1 or
newly apply for s in step t0 . Ist0 is again the same between r and (δs (r), r−s ). There are a
few cases to consider.
Case I : Both i0 and i00 apply for s at step t0 . Under r, s tentatively accepts both i0 and i00
by the assumption that there exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } ≤
ρϕis + ris . Under (δs (r), r−s ), s again tentatively accepts both i0 and i00 . This is because
{ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist0 = {ρϕis + δi (rs )}i∈Ist0 (recall i0 , i00 ∈ Ist0 by assumption and Ist0 is the same
between r and (δs (r), r−s )) and the above fact that s tentatively accepts both i0 and i00 under
r, which jointly imply that max{ρϕi0 s +δi0 s (r), ρϕi00 s +δi00 s (r)} = max{ρϕi0 s +ri0 s , ρϕi00 s +ri00 s } ≤ cs th({ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist0 ) where cs -th(·) is the cs -th order statistic. The DA algorithm also works
in the same way for the remaining steps.
Case II : Only one of i0 or i00 applies for s at step t0 . Without loss of generality, suppose
only i0 applies for s at step t0 . Under r, s tentatively accepts i0 by the assumption that there
exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that ρϕi0 s + ri0 s ≤ max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } ≤ ρϕis + ris .
Case II.A: ri0 s > ri00 s (and so δi0 s (r) < δi00 s (r)). Under (δs (r), r−s ), s also tentatively
accepts i0 by the following reason. By the above fact that s tentatively accepts i0 under r,
it holds that ρϕi0 s + ri0 s ≤ cs -th({ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist0 ), implying ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r) < ρϕi0 s + ri0 s ≤ cs th({ρϕis + δis (r)}i∈Ist0 ).
Case II.B : ri0 s < ri00 s . Under (δs (r), r−s ), s also tentatively accepts i0 by the following
reason. Suppose not. Then cs -th({ρϕis +ris }i∈Ist0 ) ≤ cs -th({ρϕis +δi (rs )}i∈Ist0 ) < ρϕi0 s +δi0 s (r) =
ρϕi00 s + ri00 s , where the first inequality ri0 s < ri00 s and the last equality uses the assumption
ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s . Let’s call cs -th({ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist0 ) the tentative cutoff for school s at step t0 , which
is common between r and (δs (r), r−s ) since Ist0 is the same between r and (δs (r), r−s ) and
ris = δis (r) for all i ∈ Ist \ i0 . Since the tentative cutoff is monotonically decreasing in
steps, the above inequality implies that for all i with Dis (r) = 1, ρϕis + ris < ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r) =
ρϕi00 s + ri00 s , contradicting the assumption that there exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that
ρϕi00 s + ri00 s ≤ max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } ≤ ρϕis + ris .
In all cases, the DA algorithm works in the same way at step t0 under r and (δs (r), r−s ).
In Case I, the DA algorithm also works in the same way for the remaining steps. In Case
II, let t1 be the step in the DA algorithm at which i00 first applies for s. If there is no such
a step t1 under either r or (δs (r), r−s ), then the DA algorithm works in the same way until
its end both under r and (δs (r), r−s ), completing the proof. Assume the existence of such a
step t1 under both r and (δs (r), r−s ). Until step t1 − 1, the DA algorithm operates in the
same way both under r and (δs (r), r−s ) since the only difference between the two situations
is the positions of i0 and i00 in rs . t1 is thus common to r and (δs (r), r−s ). Let Ist1 be the set
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of students who are kept by s from step t1 − 1 or newly apply for s in step t1 . Ist1 is again
the same between r and (δs (r), r−s ). I again consider the following two cases.
Case II.A (Continued): ri0 s > ri00 s . Under (δs (r), r−s ), s also tentatively accepts i00 by
the following reason. Suppose not. Then cs -th({ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist1 ) ≤ cs -th({ρϕis + δi (rs )}i∈Ist1 ) <
ρϕi00 s + δi00 s (r) = ρϕi0 s + ri0 s . Since the tentative cutoff is monotonically decreasing in steps, the
above inequality implies that for all i with Dis (r) = 1, ρϕis + ris < ρϕi0 s + δi0 s (r) = ρϕi00 s + ri00 s ,
contradicting the assumption that there exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that ρϕi00 s + ri00 s ≤
max{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } ≤ ρϕis + ris .
Case II.B (Continued): ri0 s < ri00 s . By the above fact that s tentatively accepts i00
under r, it holds that ρϕi00 s + ri00 s ≤ cs -th({ρϕis + ris }i∈Ist1 ), implying ρϕi00 s + δi00 s (r) < cs th({ρϕis + δis (r)}i∈Ist1 ).
In both cases, the DA algorithm works in the same way at step t1 under r and (δs (r), r−s ).
Since both i0 and i1 have already applies for s by step t1 or never apply for s, the DA
algorithm also works in the same way for the remaining steps.
Main Proof
Suppose that the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for gDA
mechanism ϕ for some school s at some assignment problem X. Fix ϕ, s, and X throughout.
For each lottery number profile r, define students i0 (r) and i1 (r) by
• i0 (r), i1 (r) ∈ F irsts (r)
• Di0 (r)s (r) = 0 and Di1 (r)s (r) = 1
• ri0 (r)s ≤ ris for all i ∈ F irsts (r) with Dis (r) = 0
• ri1 (r)s ≥ ris for all i ∈ F irsts (r) with Dis (r) = 1.
If there are no two students satisfying the conditions, let i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅. With this
convention, i0 (r) and i1 (r) are uniquely well-defined for all r. (If there are two î0 (r) 6= ĩ0 (r)
satisfying the conditions, then rî0 (r)s > rĩ0 (r)s and rî0 (r)s < rĩ0 (r)s , a contradiction. The same
logic holds for i1 (r) too.) This proof uses the following equivalent representation of gDA
mechanism ϕ.
Definition 6. Algorithm 2STAGES(r) operates in the following way.
(1) Same as in Definition 1.
(2) Same as in Definition 1.
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(3) Run the following sub-algorithm STAGE1(r): Remove i0 (r) and i1 (r) from X (without
changing anything else) and run the DA algorithm on the remaining subproblem where
schools’ strict priorities are given by (ϕrs ).
(4) Starting from the output of STAGE1(r) as the initial tentative assignment, run the
following sub-algorithm STAGE2(r): Include i0 (r) and i1 (r) and run the DA algorithm
where schools’ strict priorities are given by (ϕrs ).
By McVitie and Wilson (1970)’s order irrelevance result, 2STAGES(r) and ϕ(r) (the simplified
notation for ϕ(ρ, r)) produce the same matching for all r. Let t − 1 be the last step of
STAGE1(r) at which STAGE1(r) stops and µt−1 (r) ≡ (µst−1 (r))s∈S be the tentative matching
at the end of step t − 1. Start counting STAGE2(r)’s steps without resetting the step index,
and let t be the first step of STAGE2(r). (Note that t implicitly depends on r.)
For each lottery number profile r, define σ ∗ (r) = (σs∗0 (r))s0 ∈S as the following permutation
of r. If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅, then σ ∗ (r) = r. Otherwise, if gDA mechanism ϕ uses MTB, σ ∗ (r)
is obtained by switching only i0 (r) and i1 (r) only in rs , i.e.,
• σi∗0 (r)s (r) = ri1 (r)s
• σi∗1 (r)s (r) = ri0 (r)s
∗
• σis
(r) = ris for all i 6= i0 (r), i1 (r)
∗
0
• σis
0 (r) = rs0 for all s 6= s.

If ϕ uses STB, σ ∗ (r) is obtained by switching i0 (r) and i1 (r) in rs0 for all s0 , i.e., for all s0
• σi∗0 (r)s0 (r) = ri1 (r)s0
• σi∗1 (r)s0 (r) = ri0 (r)s0
∗
• σis
0 (r) = ris0 for all i 6= i0 (r), i1 (r).

I say two students i0 and i00 are consecutive in rs within F irsts (r) if i0 , i00 ∈ F irsts (r)
and there is no i000 ∈ F irsts (r) such that ri0 s < ri000 s < ri00 s or ri0 s > ri000 s > ri00 s . For each r,
consider a permutation σ̂s (r) 6= σs∗ (r) of rs that switches only two students i0 and i00 who are
consecutive in rs within F irsts (r). If there are no such i0 and i00 , let σ̂s (r) = rs . Let σ̂(r) be
the following. If ϕ uses MTB, let σ̂(r) = (σ̂s (r), r−s ). If ϕ uses STB, let σ̂(r) = ×|S| σ̂s (r).
Lemma 2. (A breakdown of the Fisher property discussed in Section 3.3) There exits lottery
number profile r consistent with gDA mechanism ϕ’s lottery structure (STB or MTB) such
that Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0 or Dis (σ̂(r)) 6= Dis (r) for some student i ∈ F irsts (r).
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Proof of Lemma 2. It is enough to show that if there is no r such that there exists
i ∈ F irsts (r) such that Dis (σ̂(r)) 6= Dis (r), then there exits r such that Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) =
Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that for all r, it is not the case Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) =
Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0.
Step 2.A. For all lottery number profile r with i0 (r) 6= ∅ and i1 (r) 6= ∅, Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) =
1, Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0, and Dis (σ ∗ (r)) = Dis (r) for all student i ∈ F irsts (r) with i 6= i0 (r) and
i 6= i1 (r).
Proof of Step 2.A. By the above assumption that for all r, it is not the case
Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0, it is enough to show that for all such r,
Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0 and Dis (σ ∗ (r)) = Dis (r) for all i ∈ F irsts (r) with i 6= i0 (r) and
i 6= i1 (r). Let me consider STAGE1(r) and STAGE1(σ ∗ (r)). Since everything except
i0 (r) and i1 (r)’s lottery numbers is the same between r and σ ∗ (r), both STAGE1(r) and
STAGE1(σ ∗ (r)) produce the same tentative assignment µst−1 (r) = µst−1 (σ ∗ (r)) ≡ µst−1 .
Now start STAGE2(r) and STAGE2(σ ∗ (r)). Under r, McVitie and Wilson (1970)’s order irrelevance result implies s rejects i0 (r) and tentatively accepts i1 (r), which implies
ρϕi0 (r)s + ri0 (r)s > cs -th({ρϕis + ris }i∈µst−1 ∪i0 (r)∪i1 (r) ) where cs -th(·) is the cs -th order statistic
in the input set. Under σ ∗ (r), by definition of σ ∗ (r), ρϕi1 (r)s + σi∗1 (r)s (r) = ρϕi0 (r)s + ri0 (r)s >
cs -th({ρϕis +ris }i∈µst−1 ∪i0 (r)∪i1 (r) ), resulting in s’s rejecting i1 (r). Since any rejected student
is never be accepted in the DA algorithm, this implies Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0. Dis (σ ∗ (r)) =
Dis (r) for all i ∈ F irsts (r) with i 6= i0 (r) and i 6= i1 (r) by the following reason. Suppose
not. There exists i ∈ µst−1 ∩ F irsts (r) \ {i0 (r), i1 (r)} for whom, without loss of generality, Dis (σ ∗ (r)) = 0 and Dis (r) = 1. This implies that Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0
since ρϕis + ris < ρϕi1 (r)s + ri1 (r)s < ρϕi0 (r)s + ri0 (r)s (the first inequality is by definition of
∗
i1 (r)) and so ρϕis + σis
(r) < ρϕi0 (r)s + σi∗0 (r)s (r) < ρϕi1 (r)s + σi∗1 (r)s (r). This is a contradiction
to the assumption that for all r, it is not the case Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0.
Step 2.B. For all lottery number profile r with i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅, it holds ϕ(σ ∗ (r)) = ϕ(r). For
each r and each permutation σ̂(r) 6= σ ∗ (r) defined right before Lemma 2, Dis (σ̂(r)) = Dis (r)
for all i ∈ F irsts (r).
Proof of Step 2.B. For all r with i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅, σ ∗ (r) = r and it is trivial that
ϕ(σ ∗ (r)) = ϕ(r). The second part is by assumption.
Step 2.C. For each lottery number profile r, define os (r) ≡ |{i ∈ F irsts (r)|Dis (r) = 1}|. For
each r and each permutation σs (r) of rs that permutes lottery numbers only among members
of F irsts (r), let σ(r) be the following. If ϕ uses MTB, σ(r) = (σs (r), r−s ). If ϕ uses STB,
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σ(r) = ×|S| σs (r). Then the following is true for all r.
(1) F irsts (σ(r)) = F irsts (r).
(2) os (σ(r)) = os (r).
(3) For all i and i0 in F irsts (σ(r)), if Dis (σ(r)) > Di0 s (σ(r)), then σis (r) < σi0 s (r).
Proof of Step 2.C. Since any permutation can be expressed as a composition of
contrapositions (permutations switching consecutive two elements), I can express any σ
as a composition of σ ∗ and σ̂’s defined right before Lemma 2. Steps 2.A and 2.B imply
(1) and (2). (3) follows from the fact that for all r and all i, i0 ∈ F irsts (r), ρϕis = ρϕi0 s
and another well-known property of the DA algorithm that for applicants who rank s
first and share ρϕis , Dis is monotonically decreasing in ris (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999).
Let R be the set of all possible values of r. Partition R into R1 , R2 , ..., RN such that
within each Rn , for all r, r0 ∈ Rn , r can be obtained from r0 by permutation r0 = σ(r), where
σ(r) is a permutation of r defined in Step 2.C. This partition is well-defined by Step 2.C(1):
Since Step 2.C(1) guarantees F irsts (r) = F irsts (r0 ), r0 = σ(r) for such a permutation σ
if and only if r = σ(r0 ) for such a (possibly different) permutation σ. Let rn be a generic
element of Rn . Note that F irsts (rn ) and os (rn ) are the same for all rn ∈ Rn by Step 2.C(1)
and 2.C(2), respectively. Step 2.C guarantees that conditional on each Rn , Dis (R) is independent of i’s type for all i ∈ F irsts (rn ), i.e., for all n, and θ,
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (rn ), R ∈ Rn , θi = θ) =

os (rn )
,
|F irsts (rn )|

which is independent of θi = θ. The equality holds since F irsts (rn ) and os (rn ) stay constant
across all rn ∈ Rn and under each rn , students with the os (rn )-best lottery numbers have
Dis (rn ) = 1. Therefore, for all j ∈ F irsts (r0 ),
P (D
 is (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r0 ), R ∈ Rn , θi = θ)
os (rn )


if ρϕis = ρϕjs for any j ∈ F irsts (rn )


 |F irsts (rn )|
= 1
if ρϕis < ρϕjs for any j ∈ F irsts (rn )




0
otherwise

os (rn )


if F irsts (r0 ) = F irsts (rn )


 |F irsts (rn )|
= 1
if ρϕis < ρϕjs for any j ∈ F irsts (rn )




0
otherwise
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≡ pn ,
where the second last equality holds because ρϕis = ρϕjs for any j ∈ F irsts (rn ) if and only if
F irsts (r0 ) = F irsts (rn ). pn is independent of θj . This implies that for all j ∈ F irsts (r0 )
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r0 ), θi = θ)
= ΣN
n=1 P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (r0 ), R ∈ Rn , θi = θ) × P (R ∈ Rn |i ∈ F irsts (r0 ), θi = θ)
(by the law of total probability)
= ΣN
n=1 pn × P (R ∈ Rn ),
which is again independent of θi = θ.Thus the first-choice research design extracts a random
assignment, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Remark 1. Under the alternative definition of a random assignment in Section 5.1, this part
simplifies to the following. No other part of the proof depends on which random assignment
definition I use.
P (Dis (R) = 1|i ∈ F irsts (R), θi = θ)
= ΣN
n=1 P (Dis (R) = 1|R ∈ Rn , i ∈ F irsts (R), θi = θ) × P (R ∈ Rn |i ∈ F irsts (R), θi = θ)
os (rn )
|{r ∈ Rn |i ∈ F irsts (r)}|
= ΣN
×
,
n=1
|F irsts (rn )|
|{r ∈ R|i ∈ F irsts (r)}|
which is independent of θi = θ conditional on i ∈ F irsts (R).
Case 1: There exists lottery number profile r consistent with gDA mechanism ϕ’s lottery
structure (STB or MTB) such that Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0. For each r, define rs∗
as the following permutation of rs . If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅, let rs∗ = rs . Otherwise, let
∗
• ris
= ris for all i with ρϕis 6= ρϕi0 (r)s = ρϕi1 (r)s

• ri∗1 (r)s = max{ris |ρϕis = ρϕi0 (r)s = ρϕi1 (r)s and Dis (r) = 1}
∗
• ri∗0 (r)s > ri∗1 (r)s and there is no such i that ρϕis = ρϕi0 (r)s = ρϕi1 (r)s and ri∗0 (r)s > ris
> ri∗1 (r)s
∗
∗
• ris
> rjs
if and only if ris > rjs for all i, j such that ρϕis = ρϕjs = ρϕi0 (r)s = ρϕi1 (r)s and
i 6= i0 (r), i 6= i1 (r), j 6= i0 (r), and j 6= i1 (r).

For each lottery number profile r and each school s0 6= s, define σ̃s0 (r) as the following
permutation of rs0 . (Note that σ̃s0 (r) implicitly depends on whole r.) If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅ or
MTB is used by ϕ, then σ̃s0 (r) = rs0 . Otherwise, σ̃s0 (r) is obtained by moving i1 (r) to right
above i0 (r), i.e.,
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• σ̃i1 (r)s0 (r) = max{ris0 |ris0 < ri0 (r)s0 }
• σ̃is0 (r) > σ̃js0 (r) if and only if ris0 > rjs0 for all students i, j such that i, j 6= i1 (r).
Lemma 3. (Outcome-equivalence between lottery number profiles r and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))) For
all lottery number profile r, ϕ(r) = ϕ(rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)). Therefore, Di0 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 0(=
Di0 (r)s (r)) and Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 1(= Di1 (r)s (r)).
Proof of Lemma 3. The following Steps 3.A and 3.B imply Lemma 3.
Step 3.A. For all lottery number profile r, ϕ(r) = ϕ(rs∗ , r−s ).
Proof of Step 3.A. If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅ and so rs∗ = rs , the above equality is trivial.
Otherwise, rs∗ is obtained from rs through a composition of two permutations. The first
one permutes lottery numbers only among students in some set I1 such that ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s for
all i0 , i00 ∈ I1 and there exists i with Dis (r) = 1 such that maxi0 ∈I1 {ρϕi0 s + ri0 s } ≤ ρϕis + ris .
The second permutation permutes lottery numbers only among students in some set I0
such that ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s for all i0 , i00 ∈ I0 and mini0 ∈I0 {ρϕi0 s + ri0 s } > ρϕis + ris for all i with
Dis (r) = 1. The first permutation is a composition of special permutations δ satisfying
the conditions in Lemma 1.b. If ϕ is not strategy-proof for schools, then the proof of
Theorem 1 is complete. If ϕ is strategy-proof for schools, the second permutation is a
composition of special permutations δ satisfying the conditions in Lemma 1.a. Therefore
Lemma 1 implies Step 2.A.
Step 3.B. For all lottery number profile r, ϕ(rs∗ , r−s ) = ϕ(rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)).
Proof of Step 3.B. If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅ and so σ̃−s (r) = r−s , the above inequality is
trivial. Otherwise, at the first step of the DA algorithm constituting ϕ, students apply
for schools in the same way both under (rs∗ , r−s ) and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)). In particular, i1 (r)
applies for s since i1 (r) ∈ F irsts (r). Schools also tentatively accept students in the
same way both under (rs∗ , r−s ) and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)): s does so since s has the same strict
priority ϕrs∗ both under (rs∗ , r−s ) and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)). The other schools also do so since
the only possible difference between ϕrs0 and ϕσ̃ 0 (r) is the position of i1 (r), who applies
s
for s. As a result, since Step 2.A implies Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ) = 1, s tentatively accepts i1 (r)
at the first step of the DA algorithm both under (rs∗ , r−s ) and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)). Since (a) s
has the same preference ϕrs∗ both under (rs∗ , r−s ) and (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)), (b) the only possible
difference between ϕrs0 and ϕσ̃ 0 (r) is the position of i1 (r), and (c) i1 (r) is tentatively
s
kept by s and is never be rejected by s under (rs∗ , r−s ), the DA algorithm operates in
the same way for the remaining steps, producing the same matching.
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Lemma 4. (Partial outcome-equivalence between σ ∗ (r) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r))) For all lottery number profile r with Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0, it is the case Di0 (r)s (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ),
σ̃−s (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. If i0 (r) = i1 (r) = ∅ and so σ ∗ (r) = r = (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)), Lemma 4 is
immediate. Otherwise, I first prove the following result.
Step 4.A. For all lottery number profile r with Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0, it is the
∗
case ϕ(σ ∗ (r)) = ϕ(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)).
Proof of Step 4.A. Note that
a) σi∗0 (r)s (r) = ri1 (r)s ≤ min{ri0 (r)s , ri∗0 (r)s , ri∗1 (r)s } = min{σi∗1 (r)s (r), σi∗1 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ), σi∗0 (r)s
(rs∗ , r−s )}, where the last equality follows from i0 (rs∗ , r−s ) = i0 (r) and i1 (rs∗ , r−s ) = i1 (r)
by Step 2.A.
∗
∗
∗
b) ρϕjs + σjs
(r) > ρϕis + σis
(r) for all j with ρϕjs = ρϕi0 (r)s and σjs
(r) > σi∗0 (r)s (r) and all i
with Dis (σ ∗ (r)) = 1 since Di0 (r)s (σ ∗ (r)) = 0 by assumption and i0 (r) ∈ F irsts (r) and so
i0 (r) ranks s first.

(a) and (b) imply that starting from σ ∗ (r), σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ) is obtained from σs∗ (r) through
a permutation that permutes lottery numbers only among students in some set I0 such
∗
that ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s for all i0 , i00 ∈ I0 and mini0 ∈I0 {ρϕi0 s + σi∗0 s (r)} > ρϕis + σis
(r) for all i with
Dis (σ ∗ (r)) = 1. This permutation is a composition of special permutations δ’s that
satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1.a. Therefore Lemma 1 implies Step 4.A.
∗
Now let me compare ϕ(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and ϕ(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)). At the first step
of the DA algorithm constituting ϕ, students apply for schools in the same way both under
∗
(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)). In particular, i0 (r) and i1 (r) apply for s since
i0 (r), i1 (r) ∈ F irsts (r). Schools also tentatively accept students in the same way both under
∗
(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)): s does so since s has the same strict priority
∗
ϕσs∗ (rs∗ ,r−s ) both under (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)). The other schools also
do so since the only possible differences between ϕσ∗0 (r) and ϕσ̃ 0 (r) are the positions of i0 (r)
s
s
and i1 (r), both of whom apply for s.
If s rejects both i0 (r) and i1 (r) at the first step, the proof is complete. Otherwise, s
tentatively accepts at least i0 (r) since ρϕi0 (r)s + σi∗0 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ) < ρϕi1 (r)s + σi∗1 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ). Since
ϕσ∗0 (r) and ϕσ̃ 0 (r) are equivalent over I \ {i0 (r)}, the remaining steps of the DA algorithm
s
s
∗
operate in the same way both under (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) until the
∗
point where s rejects i0 (r). s finally rejects i0 (r) since it does so under (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r))
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∗
by Step 4.A and s has the same preference ϕσs∗ (rs∗ ,r−s ) both under (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ−s
(r)) and
(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)). This implies Lemma 4.

Lemma 5. (Existence of a profitable preference manipulation) There exist (ρ∗ , r∗ ), school s’s
∗
preference s responsive with respect to (cs , ρ∗s , rs∗ ), and (ρ0s , rs0 ) such that ϕs ((ρ0s , rs0 ), (ρ∗−s , r−s
))
s ϕs (ρ∗ , r∗ ).
Proof of Lemma 5. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that there exists r such that
• Di0 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 0
• Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 1
• Di0 (r)s (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = Di1 (r)s (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = 0.
Step 5.A. ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) where µst (·) is s’s tentative assignment at the end
of step t in 2STAGES(r).
Proof of Step 5.A.
Execute STAGE1(rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) and start STAGE2(rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)).
s rejects i0 (r) and tentatively keeps i1 (r) since Di0 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 0 and
Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 1. Suppose to the contrary ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) 6= µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)).
Since |ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))| = |µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))| = cs (because s rejects i0 (r) when choosing
µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) at step t), this implies there exists a student i2 ∈ ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) such that
i2 6∈ µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)). In addition, i2 6∈ µst−1 (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i1 (r) has to be the case since
otherwise (i.e., if i2 6∈ µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) but i2 ∈ µst−1 (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i1 (r) and so i2 applies
for s at step t0 < t in STAGE1(rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))), s rejects i2 at step t and so i2 6∈ ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)),
a contradiction. This means i2 applies for s at a step t0 > t and is tentatively kept by
s. This requires that s rejects i1 (r) before or at step t0 since by definition i ϕrs∗ i1 (r) for
any i ∈ µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) \ i1 (r), which is because s rejects i0 (r) at step t and there is no
∗
such i that ρϕis = ρϕi0 (r)s = ρϕi1 (r)s and ri∗0 (r)s > ris
> ri∗1 (r)s . This is a contradiction to the
above fact that Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 1.
Step 5.B. There exists a step t0 > t in 2STAGES(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) such that µst0 (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ),
σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r) where i2 is a student with i2 ϕrs∗ i1 (r).
Proof of Step 5.B. Execute STAGE1(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) and start STAGE2(σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ),
σ̃−s (r)). School s rejects i1 (r) and tentatively keeps i0 (r) at step t since (1) µst−1 is
the same between (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) and (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)), (2) ρϕi1 (r)s + σi∗1 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ) =
ρϕi0 (r)s + ri∗0 (r)s , and (3) Di1 (r)s (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = 1. By Di0 (r)s (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = 0, school
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s rejects i0 (r) at a later step t0 > t and tentatively keeps i2 with i2 ϕσs∗ (rs∗ ,r−s ) i0 (r), which
implies i2 ϕrs∗ i1 (r) since ρϕi0 (r)s + σi∗0 (r)s (rs∗ , r−s ) = ρϕi1 (r)s + ri∗1 (r)s and σi∗2 s (rs∗ , r−s ) = ri∗2 s .
Therefore, µst0 (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r) where i2 is a student with
i2 ϕrs∗ i1 (r).
I am ready to construct a profitable preference manipulation for s. Let s be any preference for s that is responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , rs∗ ). Let ρ0s be a coarse priority order for s
such that ρ0ks > ρ0js for all k 6∈ ∪tt0 =1 µst0 (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r) and j ∈ ∪tt0 =1 µst0 (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪
i2 \ i1 (r) while ρ0ks = ρ0js if and only if ρks = ρjs for all j, k 6∈ µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r) or
j, k ∈ µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r). By Steps 5.A and 5.B, ϕs (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) while
ϕs ((ρ0s , ρ−s ), (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r).
Also, i2 ϕrs∗ i1 (r) established in Step 5.B implies i2 rs∗ i1 (r) as follows:
i2 ϕrs∗ i1 (r)
⇔ f ϕ (ρi2 s ) + g ϕ (ranki2 s ) + ri∗2 s < f ϕ (ρi1 (r)s ) + g ϕ (ranki1 (r)s ) + ri∗1 (r)s
⇒ f ϕ (ρi2 s ) + ri∗2 s < f ϕ (ρi1 (r)s ) + ri∗1 (r)s
(since ranki1 (r)s = 1 ≤ ranki2 s and g ϕ (·) is weakly increasing)
⇔ ρi2 s + ri∗2 s < ρi1 (r)s + ri∗1 (r)s
(since f ϕ (·) is strictly increasing)
⇔ i2 rs∗ i1 (r).
Thus ϕs ((ρ0s , ρ−s ), (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)) = µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) ∪ i2 \ i1 (r) s µst (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)) =
ϕs (ρ, (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))) since s is responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , rs∗ ), showing that when (ρs , rs∗ )
is s’s true private information, (ρ0s , σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s )) is a profitable manipulation for s with respect
to any s responsive with respect to (cs , ρs , rs∗ ); therefore ϕ is not strategy-proof for s at X.
Figure 3 summarizes the structure of the above proof.
Case 2: There exist r consistent with ϕ’s lottery structure (STB or MTB) and i ∈ F irsts (r)
such that Dis (σ̂(r)) 6= Dis (r) where σ̂(r) is a permutation defined right before Lemma 2, i.e.,
a permutation that switches only two students i0 and i00 who are consecutive in rs within
F irsts (r). By the definition of σ̂(r), it is the case Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r). There are two cases to
consider.
Case 2.a: Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 1. Then there exists j with Dis (r) = 1 such that max{ρϕi0 s +
ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } ≤ ρϕjs + rjs . If ϕ uses MTB, σ̂(r) satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1.b,
implying ϕ(σ̂(r)) = ϕ(r) by Lemma 1.b. This is a contradiction to Dis (σ̂(r)) 6= Dis (r).
If ϕ uses STB, suppose to the contrary that Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 1. At the first step of the
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Figure 3: Structure of the proof (Case 1)
The first-choice research design does not extracts a random assignment
for school s for gDA mechanism ϕ
⇓
A breakdown of the Fisher property
(Lemma 2)

(ρ, r)

Outcome-equivalent

/

(ρ, σ ∗ (r))

Partially outcome-equivalent (Lemma 4)

(ρ, (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)))
(Lemma 3)
(ρ, (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r)))

School s relegates “nuisance students”

Profitable manipulation /
((ρ0s , ρ−s ), (σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s ), σ̃−s (r)))
for school s (Lemma 5)

⇓
gDA mechanism ϕ is not strategy-proof for school s

DA algorithm, students apply for schools in the same way both under r and σ̂(r). In particular, i0 and i00 apply for s since i0 , i00 ∈ F irsts (r) and both of them rank s first. Schools also
tentatively accept students in the same way both under r and σ̂(r): The other schools than
s do so since the only possible differences between ϕrs0 and ϕσ̂ 0 (r) are the positions of i0 and
s
i00 , both of whom apply for s. s accepts the same students including i0 and i00 since Di0 s (r) =
Di00 s (r) = 1 and {ρϕjs + rjs |j applies for s at the first step of the DA algorithm under r} =
{ρϕjs + σ̂js (r)|j applies for s at the first step of the DA algorithm under σ̂(r)}, which is because the same students apply for s both under r and σ̂(r), ρϕjs + rjs = ρϕjs + σ̂js (r) for all
j 6= i0 , i00 , ρϕi0 s + ri0 s = ρϕi00 s + σ̂i00 s (r), and ρϕi00 s + ri00 s = ρϕi0 s + σ̂i0 s (r). Since (a) the only possible
differences between ϕrs0 and ϕσ̂ 0 (r) are the positions of i0 and i00 , and (b) i0 and i00 are tentas
tively kept by s and is never be rejected by s under r, the DA algorithm operates in the same
way for the remaining steps, producing the same matching. This implies Dis (σ̂(r)) = Dis (r)
for all i ∈ F irsts (r), a contradiction.
Case 2.b: Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that there exist r
and i ∈ F irsts (r) such that Dis (σ̂(r)) = 0 6= 1 = Dis (r). Let i∗ be the student with
i∗ ∈ F irsts (r), Di∗ s (r) = 1, and ri∗ s ≥ rjs for all j ∈ F irsts (r) with Djs (r) = 1. Until the
end of Case 2.b, change i∗ ’s preference i∗ to 0i∗ such that s 0i∗ ∅ 0i∗ s0 for all s0 6= s.
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This does not change Di∗ s (r) = 1 or Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 0. Note that Di∗ s (σ̂(r)) = 0 6=
1 = Di∗ s (r) since Dis (σ̂(r)) = 0 and ρϕi∗ s + σ̂i∗ s (r) = ρϕi∗ s + ri∗ s ≥ ρϕis + ris = ρϕis + σ̂is (r)
for any i ∈ F irsts (r) with Dis (σ̂(r)) = 0 6= 1 = Dis (r). Without loss of generality, assume
ri0 s < ri00 s so that σ̂i00 s (r) < σ̂i0 s (r). Let σ̂s# (r) be the further permutation of σ̂s (r) such
that σ̂i#00 s (r) = min{σ̂js (r)|j ∈ F irsts (r), Djs (r) = 0}, σ̂i#0 s (r) = min{σ̂js (r) 6= σ̂i#00 s (r)|j ∈
#
#
F irsts (r), Djs (r) = 0}, and σ̂js
(r) > σ̂ks
(r) if and only if σ̂js (r) > σ̂ks (r) for all j, k ∈
0 00
I \ {i , i }.
Lemma 6. Di∗ s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = Di00 s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that min{ρϕi0 s + σ̂i0 s (r), ρϕi00 s + σ̂i00 s (r)} = min{ρϕi0 s + ri0 s , ρϕi00 s + ri00 s } >
ρϕi∗ s + ri∗ s = ρϕi∗ s + σ̂i∗ s (r), where the first and last equalities are by ρϕi0 s = ρϕi00 s (implied by
i0 , i00 ∈ F irsts (r)) and the definition of σ̂s (r) while the middle inequality is by Di∗ s (r) = 1
and Di0 s (r) = Di00 s (r) = 0. Thus, Di00 s (σ̂(r)) = Di0 s (σ̂(r)) = 0. If ϕ is not strategy-proof
for schools, then the proof of Theorem 1 is complete. If ϕ is strategy-proof for schools, by
Lemma 1.a and the definition of σ̂s# (r), it holds ϕ(σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = ϕ(σ̂(r)), which implies
Lemma 6.
Let σ̂s## (r) be the permutation of σ̂s# (r) that switches i∗ and i00 , who are consecutive within
F irsts (r) under σ̂s# (r).
Lemma 7. Di∗ s (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 and Di00 s (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 7. Note that Di∗ s (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 1 and Di00 s (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 0 by Lemma 1.a
and the definition of σ̂s# (r). Since the only differences between (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) and (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r))
are the positions of i∗ and i00 in the priority order at s and the positions of i0 and i00 in the
priority order at s0 6= s, both under (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) and (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)), the DA algorithm
operates in the same way until i0 is rejected by s. School s rejects i0 in both scenarios
since Di00 s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 (as shown at the start of this proof) and ρϕi0 s + σ̂i##
0 s (r) =
ϕ
#
ϕ
#
ϕ
##
ρi0 s + σ̂i0 s (r) > ρi00 s + σ̂i00 s (r) = ρi∗ s + σ̂i∗ s (r).
Since i0 has a weakly worse lottery number under σ̂s0 (r) than under rs0 for all s0 6= s, i is
less likely to crowd other applicants out from other schools than s and the chain reactions
of new rejections and applications caused by s’s rejection of i0 are less likely to go back
to s under (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) than under (σ̂s# (r), r−s ). Also, since the only other difference
between (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) and (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) is the school-s lottery numbers of i00 and i∗ , i.e.,
#
##
ϕ
ϕ
00
σ̂i#∗ s (r) = σ̂i##
is rejected by s under
00 s (r) 6= σ̂i00 s (r) = σ̂i∗ s (r), and ρi00 s = ρi∗ s , when i
#
∗
##
∗
(σ̂s (r), r−s ), i may be rejected by s under (σ̂s (r), σ̂−s (r)). But i ranks only s in 0i∗ and
causes no additional rejections at other schools while i00 may rank other schools than s and
may cause additional rejections at other schools.
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By these two factors, the set of rejections made by schools other than s is weakly larger in
the set inclusion sense under (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) than under (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)), i.e., {(j, s0 )|Djs00 (σ̂s##
(r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 for all s00 j s0 } ⊆ {(j, s0 )|Djs00 (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 0 for all s00 j s0 }. Therefore,
the set of applicants for s is weakly larger in the set inclusion sense under (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) than
under (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)), i.e., {j|Djs0 (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 for all s0 j s} ⊆ {j|Djs0 (σ̂s# (r), r−s )
= 0 for all s0 j s}. As a result it has to be the case that the cutoff at s is smaller (more
strict) under (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) than under (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)), i.e.,
##
max{ρϕjs + σ̂js
(r)|Djs (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 1}
##
= cs -th{ρϕjs + σ̂js
(r)|Djs0 (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 for all s0 j s}
#
≥ cs -th{ρϕjs + σ̂js
(r)|Djs0 (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 0 for all s0 j s}
#
= max{ρϕjs + σ̂js
(r)|Djs (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 1}
≥ ρϕi∗ s + ri∗ s
= ρϕi00 s + σ̂i##
00 s (r),

where the first inequality is by {j|Djs0 (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 for all s0 j s} ⊆ {j|Djs0 (σ̂s# (r),
r−s ) = 0 for all s0 j s} (shown above), the second inequality is by Di∗ s (σ̂s# (r), r−s ) = 1
(shown at the start of this proof), and the last equality is by the definition of σ̂i##
00 s (r). cs -th{·}
##
00
is the cs -th order statistic. This implies Di00 s (σ̂s (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 1 (by i ∈ F irsts (r)). This
also implies Di∗ s (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 since otherwise Di∗ s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = Di00 s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r))
= 1 by Lemma 1.b, a contradiction to Di∗ s (σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) = 0 in Lemma 6.
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply gDA mechanism ϕ is not strategy-proof for schools by the same
argument as Case 1 where students i00 and i∗ perform the roles of students i1 (r) and i0 (r),
respectively, in Case 1 while the permutation from lottery number profile (σ̂s## (r), σ̂−s (r)) to
(σ̂s# (r), σ̂−s (r)) performs the role of the permutation from lottery number profile r to σ ∗ (r)
in Case 1.

A.2

Proof of Corollary 1.b

Proof. Consider a special case of the proof of Theorem 1 where I suppose that the firstchoice research design does not extract a random assignment for the DA mechanism with
STB when there are no priorities, i.e., ρis = ρjs for all i, j, and s. By the STB lottery
structure, ris0 = ris00 for all i, s0 , and s00 , and the order of ris is the same as the order of ρϕis
for any s. In this case, Case 2 never happens and only Case 1 is relevant. In Case 1, by
the no-priority and STB assumptions, rs∗ = σ̃s0 (r) for all s0 6= s. This implies that under
the preferences induced by (ρ, (rs∗ , σ̃−s (r))), all schools share the same preference as s’s rs∗ .
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The proof of Theorem 1 implies that when all the other other schools than s commonly
report (ρs , rs∗ ), reporting (ρ0s , σs∗ (rs∗ , r−s )) is a profitable preference manipulation for s with
respect to rs∗ . This contradicts the fact that for the DA mechanism, truth-telling is optimal
for s when all the other schools report the same preference as s’s true preference. (For a
formal proof of this well-known fact, see Hatfield et al. (2016) Proposition 4 and Lemma
1.) Therefore, for problems with no priorities, the first-choice research design must extract
a random assignment for the DA mechanism with STB.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Take any three schools and label them as A, B, and C. Consider any student preference profile that can be written as follows for some k 6= l and k, l ≥ 1:
1 : B, A, ∅
2 , ..., k : B, ∅
k+1 : C, A, ∅
k+2 , ..., k+l : C, ∅
ρA , ρB , ρC : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Without loss of generality, assume l > k. If k = 1, set k : B, A, ∅. The capacity of each
school is 1 while the treatment school is A. Since both students 1 and k + 1 rank A second
and have the same priority at A, for any gDA mechanism ϕ, we have
ρϕ1A ≡ f ϕ (ρ1A ) + g ϕ (rank1A ) = f ϕ (ρk+1,A ) + g ϕ (rankk+1,A ) ≡ ρϕk+1,A ,
which I denote by ρ. Nevertheless, it turns out that for any gDA mechanism with any lottery
structure,
P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 ) < P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1 ).
To see this, note that for any gDA mechanism, student 1 is assigned to B with probability
1
since only students 1 to k rank B, and all of them rank B first so that for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., k},
k
ρϕiB ≡ f ϕ (ρiB ) + g ϕ (rankiB ) = f ϕ (ρjB ) + g ϕ (rankjB ) ≡ ρϕjB .
1
Likewise, for any gDA mechanism, student k + 1 is assigned to C with probability . Based
l
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on these facts, I first analyze any gDA mechanism with STB by considering the following
cases.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor k + 1 applies for A, i.e., 1 and k + 1 are assigned B and
1
1
C, respectively. This case happens with probability × since student 1 is assigned to
k
l
1
1
B with probability , student k + 1 is assigned to C with probability , and these two
k
l
events are independent since there is no overlap between applicants for B and those for C
so that {RiB | i ranks B} and {RiC | i ranks C} are independent. In this case, no student
applies for A, and A is undersubscribed. Recall that I define ZiA (r) = 1 for all i if there
is no j with DjA (r) = 1. Both students 1 and k + 1 are therefore qualified for A, i.e.,
Z1A (r) = Zk+1,A (r) = 1.
1 l−1
Case ii : Only student k + 1 applies for A. This case happens with probability ×
. In
kϕ
l
ϕ
this case, student k + 1 is always assigned to A and qualified for A. By ρ1A = ρk+1,A shown
above and the fact that student k + 1 gets the single seat at A, student 1 is qualified for A
(i.e., Z1A (R) = 1) if and only if student 1 has a better lottery number than student k +1 at A
(i.e., R1A < Rk+1,A ). Let U [a, b] be a random variable drawn from the uniform distribution
over [a, b], Beta(α, β) be a random variable drawn from the beta distribution with parameters (α, β), f (x; α, β) and F (x; α, β) be the pdf and cdf, respectively, of Beta(α, β), and
Γ(·) be the Gamma function. Conditional on Case ii, student 1 has a better lottery number than student k+1 at A and so qualified there (Z1A (R) = 1) with the following probability.
Pr(R1A < Rk+1,A |D1B (R) = 1, Dk+1,C (R) = 0)
= Pr(min{R1B , ..., RkB } < U [min{Rk+2,C , ..., Rk+l,C }, 1])
= Pr(min{R1A , ..., RkA } < U [min{Rk+2,A , ..., Rk+l,A }, 1])
Z 1
=
Pr(Beta(1, k) < U [x, 1]) × f (x; 1, l − 1)dx
0

Z

1

Z

1

F (y; 1, k) ×

=
0

Z

x
1Z

=
0

x

1

Γ(1 + k)
Γ(1)Γ(k)

Z

1
dyf (x; 1, l − 1)dx
1−x
y

(1 − t)k−1 dt

0

Γ(1 + k)Γ(l)
=
{Γ(1)}2 Γ(k)Γ(l − 1)

Z

1

Z

1

(−
0

x

1
Γ(l)
dy
(1 − x)l−2 dx
1 − x Γ(1)Γ(l − 1)

(1 − y)k − 1
)dy(1 − x)l−3 dx
k
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=
=

=

Γ(1 + k)Γ(l)
{Γ(1)}2 Γ(k)Γ(l − 1)

Z
0

1

(1 − x)k+1
+x−1
(− k + 1
)(1 − x)l−3 dx
k

Γ(1 + k)Γ(l)
k+l
×
2
{Γ(1)} Γ(k)Γ(l − 1) (1 + k)(l − 1)(k + l − 1)
k(k + l)
+ k)(k + l − 1)

{Γ(1)}2 (1

≡ p1 (k, l),
where the second equality is by the STB lottery structure while the first and third equalities
use the following facts, respectively:
• If X ∼ U [0, 1], then the distribution of X conditional on X ≥ x0 is U [x0 , 1] where x0
is any constant on [0, 1].
• RiA ’s are i.i.d. samples from U [0, 1] while the k-th order statistic of n i.i.d. samples
from U [0, 1] is distributed according to Beta(k, n + 1 − k) (Casella and Berger (2002),
p.230).
k−1 1
Case iii : Only student 1 applies for A. This case happens with probability
× by
k
l
the same reason as in Case ii. In this case, 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Since
ρϕ1A = ρϕk+1,A and student 1 gets the single seat at A, student k + 1 is qualified for A if and
only if student k + 1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A. By the same reasoning as in
Case ii, conditional on Case iii, student k + 1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A and
so qualified there (Zk+1,A (R) = 1) with probability p1 (l, k).
Case iv : Both students 1 and k + 1 apply for A. This case happens with probability
k−1 l−1
×
by the same reason as in Cases iii and iv. In this case, again by ρϕ1A = ρϕk+1,A ,
k
l
only one of students 1 and k + 1 with a better lottery number is assigned to A and qualified
for A. Conditional on Case iv, student 1 has a better lottery number than k + 1 at A and
so qualified there (Z1A (R) = 1) with the following probability.
p
≡ Pr(R1A < Rk+1,A |D1B (R) = 0, Dk+1,C (R) = 0)
= Pr(U [min{R2,B , ..., Rk,B }, 1] < U [min{Rk+2,C , ..., Rk+l,C }, 1])
= Pr(U [min{R2,A , ..., Rk,A }, 1] < U [min{Rk+2,A , ..., Rk+l,A }, 1])
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= Pr(U [Beta(1, k − 1), 1] < U [Beta(1, l − 1), 1])
Z 1Z 1
=
Pr(U [x, 1] < U [y, 1]) × f (x; 1, k − 1) × f (y; 1, l − 1)dxdy
0

0
1Z

Z

1

1

Z

=
0

0
1Z

Z

y
1Z

max{t − x, 0} 1
Γ(k)
Γ(l)
dt
(1 − x)k−2 ×
(1 − y)l−2 dxdy
1−x
1 − y Γ(1)Γ(k − 1)
Γ(1)Γ(l − 1)

1

max{t − x, 0}dt

=
0

0

y

Γ(k)
Γ(l)
(1 − x)k−3 ×
(1 − y)l−3 dxdy,
Γ(1)Γ(k − 1)
Γ(1)Γ(l − 1)

where the third equality uses the STB lottery regime while the fifth equality uses the fact
that (R2A , ..., RkA ) and (Rk+2,A , ..., Rk+l,A ) are independent. Letting
p̄
≡ Pr(R1A > Rk+1,A |D1B (R) = 0, Dk+1,C (R) = 0)
Z 1Z 1Z 1
Γ(k)
Γ(l)
=
max{t − y, 0}dt
(1 − x)k−3 ×
(1 − y)l−3 dxdy,
Γ(1)Γ(k
−
1)
Γ(1)Γ(l
−
1)
0
0
x
we have
p/p̄
Z 1Z
0

=Z

0

1

0
1

Z
0

1

Z

max{t − x, 0}dt(1 − x)k−3 × (1 − y)l−3 dxdy

y
1

Z

1

max{t − y, 0}dt(1 − x)k−3 × (1 − y)l−3 dxdy

x

≤ 1,
1
where the last inequality is because of l > k. Therefore, since p + p̄ = 1, we have p ≤ and
2
1
p̄ ≥ .
2
To sum up all cases, students 1 and k + 1’s qualification probabilities at A are different
as follows:
Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 )
= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x) × Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 , Case x)
=

1 1 1 l−1
k−1 1 k−1 l−1
× + ×
× p1 (k, l) +
× +
×
×p
k
l
k
l
k
l
k
l
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=

1 1 1 l−1 k−1 1 1 l−1
k−1 l−1
× + ×
+
× + ×
× (p1 (k, l) − 1) +
×
×p
l
k
k
l} |k
l
|k
{zl
{z
} | k
{z l
}
≡p2 (k,l)

< p2 (k, l) +

≡p3 (k,l)

k−1 1
k−1 l−1
× × (p1 (l, k) − 1) +
×
× p̄
l {z
| k
} | k
{z l
}
>p3 (k,l)

=

≡p4 (k,l)

≥p4 (k,l) (by p̄ ≥ p)

1 1 1 l−1 k−1 1
k−1 l−1
× + ×
+
× × p1 (l, k) +
×
× p̄
k
l
k
l
k
l
k
l

= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x) × Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1 , Case x)
= P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1 ),
where the key inequality
•

k−1 1
× × (p1 (l, k) − 1) > p3 (k, l) comes from the following facts:
k
l

1 l−1
k−1 1
×
>
× > 0 (by l > k ≥ 2).
k
l
k
l

• p1 (k, l)−1 < p1 (l, k)−1 < 0 (the first inequality is by l > k while the second inequality
is because both p1 (k, l) and p1 (k, l) are nondegenerate conditional probabilities).
This proves that there is no gDA mechanism with the STB lottery structure for which the
qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment.
For any gDA mechanism with MTB, the argument is simplified as follows.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor k + 1 applies for A, i.e., 1 and k + 1 are assigned B and C,
1 1
respectively. This case happens with probability × . In this case, no student applies for
k
l
A, and A is undersubscribed. Both students 1 and k + 1 are therefore qualified for A.
1
l−1
Case ii : Only student k + 1 applies for A. This case happens with probability ×
.
k
l
In this case, student k + 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Student 1 is qualified
for A if and only if student 1 has a better lottery number than student k + 1 at A. By
ρϕ1A = ρϕk+1,A , this happens with probability 1/2 by the MTB lottery structure, where R1A
and Rk+1,A are i.i.d. even conditional on Case ii (D1B (R) = 1 and Dk+1,C (R) = 0).
k−1 1
Case iii : Only student 1 applies for A. This case happens with probability
× . In
k
l
this case, student 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Student k + 1 is qualified for A
if and only if student k + 1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A. By the same reasoning
as in Case ii, this happens with probability 1/2.

56

Case iv : Both students 1 and k + 1 apply for A. This case happens with probability
k−1 l−1
×
. In this case, only one of students 1 and k + 1 with a better lottery number
k
l
is assigned A and qualified for A. Conditional on Case iv, by ρϕ1A = ρϕk+1,A , student 1 has a
better lottery number than k + 1 at A with probability 1/2.
To sum up all cases, students 1 and k + 1’s qualification probabilities at A are different
as follows:
Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 )
= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x) × Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1 , Case x)
1 1 1 l−1 1 k−1 1 k−1 l−1 1
× + ×
× +
× +
×
×
k
l
k
l
2
k
l
k
l
2
1 1 1 l−1 k−1 1 1 k−1 l−1 1
< × + ×
+
× × +
×
×
k
l
k
l
k
l
2
k
l
2
=

= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x) × Pr(ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1 , Case x)
= P (ZiA (R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1 ),
where the key inequality is by l > k. Therefore, at the above problem, there is no gDA
mechanism with any lottery structure for which the qualification IV research design extracts
a random assignment.

B
B.1

Additional Discussion
General Definition of a Random Assignment

Definitions 2 and 4 in the main body define a random assignment under the first-choice and
qualification instrumental variable (IV) research designs, respectively. This section explains
these definitions are special cases of a unified definition of a random assignment under
general empirical research designs. It is therefore legitimate to compare the first-choice and
qualification IV research designs based on Definitions 2 and 4.
Given any dataset from any assignment problem, I consider a class of empirical research
designs that try to identify causal effects of being assigned to any given treatment school s.
Each research design in this class tries to achieve the goal by instrumenting for the treatment
assignment (Dis (r0 )) with some instrumental variable Zis∗ (r0 ), where r0 is the realized lottery
number profile in the data. For simplicity, I consider only binary instrumental variables, i.e.,
Zis∗ (·) : R → {0, 1} where R is the set of all possible lottery number profiles. Define Θ as
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the set of all possible student types θi = (i , (ρis )s∈S ). Let (Θ1 , ..., Θm ) be a partition of
Θ with ∪m
k=1 Θk = Θ. I allow the research design to do instrumenting conditional on which
type partition cell contains each student’s type (i.e., conditional on (1{θi ∈ Θk })k=1,...,m ) and
within a restricted sample Is∗ (r0 ) ⊂ I, where Is∗ (·) : R → I where I is the set of all subsets
of the set of students I.
For outcome Yi of interest, the research design measures the effect of treatment assignment Dis (r0 ) on Yi by estimating the following Two Stage Least Square regression model or
a similar IV model within the restricted sample Is∗ (r0 ):
k
Yi = α2 + β2 Dis (r0 ) + Σm
k=1 γ2 1{θi ∈ Θk }) + 2i (second stage regression)
k
Dis (r0 ) = α1 + β1 Zis∗ (r0 ) + Σm
k=1 γ1 1{θi ∈ Θk }) + 1i (first stage regression)

The above class of research designs is parametrized by what IV to use (Zis∗ ), which aspects
of student type to control for (Θ1 , ..., Θm ), and what sample restriction to impose (Is∗ ). I
allow these objects to change depending on different gDA mechanisms. For any research
design in the class, I introduce the following definition of extracting a random assignment.
Definition 7. An empirical research design with instrumental variable Zis∗ , conditioning
(Θ1 , ..., Θm ), and sample restriction Is∗ extracts a random assignment for a gDA mechanism ϕ if at any assignment problem X and for any school s,
P (Zis∗ (R) = 1|i ∈ Is∗ (r), (1{θi ∈ Θk })k=1,...,m = v, θi = θ)
= P (Zis∗ (R) = 1|i ∈ Is∗ (r), (1{θi ∈ Θk })k=1,...,m = v),
for any potential lottery realizations r, any vector v ∈ {0, 1}m , and any student type θ for
which these conditional probabilities are well-defined.
Only under this conditionally random assignment does the IV Zis∗ generate an exogenous
or random variation in assignment treatment Dis (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4,
Manski (2008) chapter 3, Angrist and Pischke (2009) chapter 4). Whether a research design
extracts a random assignment depends on which gDA mechanism generates the data since
different mechanisms produce different Zis∗ , (Θ1 , ..., Θm ), and Is∗ .
The first-choice and qualification IV research designs are two members of this research
design class. The first-choice design corresponds to a research design with the treatment
assignment as the instrumental variable Zis∗ (r) = Dis (r), no conditioning (Θ1 , ..., Θm ) = Θ,
and sample restriction Is∗ (r) = F irsts (r). The qualification IV design corresponds to a
research design with the qualification instrumental variable Zis∗ (r) = Zis (r), modified priority
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conditioning Θk = {θ ∈ Θ|ρϕis = k}, and no sample restriction Is∗ (r) = I. Substituting these
corresponding objects shows that Definition 7 nests as special cases Definitions 2 and 4 for
the first-choice and qualification IV research designs, respectively. Definitions 2 and 4 are
therefore comparable, making it legitimate to use these definitions to compare the first-choice
and qualification IV research designs.

B.2

Strategy-proofness for Schools is not Exactly Necessary

Section 3.4 shows that the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment
for the DA, Charlotte, and top trading cycles mechanisms, which are not strategy-proof for
schools. This suggests strategy-proofness for schools is almost necessary for the first-choice
research design to extract a random assignment. On the other hand, strategy-proofness for
schools turns out to be not exactly necessary. To see this, consider the following mechanism. Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the partially deferred
acceptance mechanism is defined through the following algorithm.32
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school accepts its highest-priority (with respect to ρis + ris ) students up to its capacity
and rejects every other student. Finalize these acceptances and subtract the number
of each school’s acceptances from that school’s capacity.
• Step 2: Each student who has not been accepted by any school applies to her most
preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each school tentatively
keeps the highest-ranking students up to its remaining capacity (after the subtraction
at step 1), and rejects every other student.
In general, for any step t ≥ 3,
• Step t: Each student i who was not tentatively assigned to any school in Step t − 1
applies to her most preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its remaining capacity (after
the subtraction at step 1) from the set of students tentatively assigned to this school in
previous step t − 1 and the students newly applying, and rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step at which no student applies to any school. Each
student tentatively kept by a school at that step or accepted by that school at step 1 is
allocated a seat in that school, resulting in an assignment.
32
Agarwal and Somaini (2015) call this mechanism the “first preferences first” mechanism while the same
name is used by others to mean a different mechanism. I use a different name to avoid confusion.
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The partially deferred acceptance mechanism is a mix of the Boston mechanism and
the DA mechanism in that the first step is process as in the Boston mechanism while the
remaining steps are processed as in the DA mechanism. The partially deferred acceptance
mechanism can be interpreted as modifying priorities so that each school prioritizes students ranking it first over students ranking it lower, and the partially deferred acceptance
mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (f ϕ (m) = m, g ϕ (n) = 1{n 6= 1}(K + 1)).
The partially deferred acceptance mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools by a similar
reason for the DA mechanism. However, the first-choice research design extracts a random
assignment for the partially deferred acceptance mechanism with any lottery regime. The
reason is that given any assignment problem and lottery realization, the treatment assignments of students ranking the treatment school first are finalized at the first step of the
algorithm, and their treatment assignments (whether each of them is assigned to the firstchoice treatment school) are the same as those produced by the Boston mechanism with the
same lottery realization. Corollary 1(a) therefore implies that the first-choice design extracts
a random assignment under the partially deferred acceptance mechanism with any lottery
regime. Hence, the first-choice research design may extract a random assignment even for a
mechanism that is not strategy-proof for schools.
Nevertheless, I am not aware of any empirical study that uses data from the partially
deferred acceptance mechanism. As long as more widely-used and widely-discussed mechanisms such as the Boston, DA, Charlotte, and top trading cycles mechanisms are concerned,
strategy-proof for schools is necessary, as summarized in Proposition 1.
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